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Abstract
How much of the variation in state effectiveness is due to the individuals and organizations re-
sponsible for implementing policy? We investigate this question and its implications for policy design
in the context of public procurement, using a text-based product classification method to measure bu-
reaucratic output. We show that effective procurers lower bid preparation/submission costs, and that
60% of within-product purchase-price variation across 16 million purchases in Russia in 2011-2015 is
due to the bureaucrats and organizations administering procurement processes. This has dramatic
policy consequences. To illustrate these, we study a ubiquitous procurement policy: bid preferences
for favored firms (here domestic manufacturers). The policy decreases overall entry and increases
prices when procurers are effective, but has the opposite impact with ineffective procurers, as pre-
dicted by a simple endogenous-entry model of procurement. Our results imply that the state’s often
overlooked bureaucratic tier is critical for effectiveness and the make-up of optimal policies.
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1 Introduction
Many policies work well in some countries or regions and poorly in others. Value-added taxes generate
the intended paper trails and tax compliance in most developed countries, but rarely do so in developing
countries (Bird & Gendron, 2007). The NREGA employment guarantee scheme supports poor workers
and helps complete important infrastructure projects in some Indian states, but is largely unused in oth-
ers (Gulzar & Pasquale, 2017). The postal services in Algeria, Barbados, and Uruguay comply with the
policy of returning incorrectly addressed letters to sender, but the ones in Cambodia, Russia, and Tajik-
istan do not (Chong et al. , 2014). The list of examples is long and covers nearly all areas of policymaking
(Rodrik, 2009). At the same time, recent research has documented dramatic differences in the character-
istics of the workers and organizations that implement state policies, both across and within countries.1
To what extent does the effectiveness of the bureaucratic apparatus help explain the variation in public
sector output achieved under a given policy regime? And what are the implications for policy design?
To shed light on these questions, we focus on a well-defined form of output produced throughout
the state—prices paid for goods procured—and use administrative data covering the universe of pub-
lic procurement in Russia from 2011 through 2015. We show that under a standard policy regime that
treats all suppliers equally, 60% of the variation in prices paid is attributable to the bureaucratic appa-
ratus. These differences in effectiveness across procurers can fundamentally alter the impact of policy
changes. When a policy favoring domestic manufacturers is introduced, supplier entry and purchase
prices improve in procurement processes run by ineffective procurers, but worsen in processes run by
effective procurers. Our results demonstrate that increasing bureaucratic effectiveness could save the
state billions of dollars every year, but also that policies tailored to the effectiveness of the individuals
and organizations running the state enterprise can act as a partial substitute for improving effectiveness.
Public procurement in Russia is an ideal setting in which to study micro level state effectiveness
for two reasons. First, procurement, which makes up roughly 8 percent of worldwide GDP (Schapper
et al. , 2009), is one of the few state activities whose output is relatively well-defined, measurable, and
comparable across the entire public sector.2 Second, Russia is unusual among low- and middle-income
countries in that detailed datasets spanning its massive and diverse bureaucracy are available.
There are three parts to our empirical analysis. We start by developing a text-based machine learning
method that assigns procurement purchases of off-the-shelf goods to homogeneous bins. This allows
us to compare bureaucrats and organizations across the country performing the same task. We then
exploit the fact that many bureaucrats (procurement officers) are observed working with multiple end-
user organizations (e.g. ministries, schools or hospitals) and vice versa. This provides us with thousands
1See for example Dal Bo et al. (2013); Duflo et al. (2013); Ashraf et al. (2014a,b); Hanna & Wang (2015); Callen et al. (2016a,b);
Deserranno (2016); Bertrand et al. (2016). The literature has focused mostly on front-line public sector workers; for an excellent
overview, see Finan et al. (forthcoming). On variation in state capacity, see, among many others, La Porta et al. (1999); Besley
& Persson (2009, 2010); Acemoglu et al. (2015); Bai & Jia (2016); Dell et al. (2017).
2Newly available procurement data are therefore being used to investigate key open questions on state effectiveness. Like
Bandiera et al. (2009) and Ferraz et al. (2015) we focus on purchases of items that are precisely defined (“off-the-shelf” goods),
for which procurers’ mandate is simply to acquire the items at the lowest possible price while following the government’s
policy rules. Such purchases make up over half of total public procurement in Russia (see Online Appendix Table OA.3). See
also Lewis-Faupel et al. (2015); Coviello & Gagliarducci (forthcoming); Coviello et al. (2017).
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of quasi-experiments that we can use to estimate the causal effect of specific individuals and organiza-
tions on prices paid. To do so, we combine the variance decomposition method of Abowd et al. (1999,
2002) with split-sample and shrinkage tools to correct for sampling error (Finkelstein et al. , 2016; Kane
& Staiger, 2008). In the third part of the paper, instead of holding the policy environment constant and
studying variation in output across procurers, we hold the bureaucrats and organizations constant and
vary whether a particular procurement policy—bid preferences for domestic manufacturers—applies.
Using the fact that the policy applies to an evolving set of goods and is in effect only parts of each year in
a difference-in-differences approach, we estimate its average impact on prices paid, supplier entry and
the share of contracts going to domestic firms. We then show how the impact of the policy depend on
the effectiveness of the implementing bureaucrat and organization.
To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a stylized model of public procurement auctions. In
the model, suppliers decide whether to enter an auction by trading off their expected profits against the
costs imposed on auction participants by the bureaucracy. Ineffective bureaucracies impose high par-
ticipation costs and as a result attract fewer bidders and pay higher prices. Introducing bid preferences
for domestically manufactured goods, which we assume to be more expensive to produce on average,
encourages entry by domestic manufacturers but discourages entry by foreign manufacturers. The net
effect depends on the baseline level of entry. We show that for ineffective bureaucracies, the expected
net effect is higher entry and lower prices, while for effective bureaucracies, the net effect is the opposite.
We present four main empirical findings. First, we show that the individuals and organizations in
the bureaucratic apparatus together account for 60 percent of the variation in the prices the government
pays for its inputs in a standard policy regime that treats all suppliers equally. Bureaucrats and organi-
zations each account for roughly equal shares of this overall effect. A battery of tests gives no indication
that the log-linearity and “conditional random mobility” assumptions needed to interpret our estimated
bureaucrat and organization effects causally are violated.3 The variance decomposition exercise thus
informs us of the degree to which state effectiveness, in weak institutional contexts such as Russia, can
be enhanced by attracting more individuals at the high end of the observed performance range, im-
proving the performance of existing bureaucrats, or lifting organization-wide characteristics such as
management or “organizational culture” towards the high end of the observed range. Our estimates im-
ply, for example, that moving the worst-performing 20 percent of bureaucrats and organizations to 50th
percentile–effectiveness would save the Russian government 37.3 percent of the approximately USD 185
billion it spends on procurement annually.
Second, we show what effective procurers do differently. We correlate the effectiveness estimates
with a rich set of indicators on how different procurers’ purchases are conducted and their intermediate
outcomes. We find that effective bureaucrats and organizations impose lower entry costs on suppliers,
as predicted by our conceptual framework, and that they attract different types of entrants.4
3The same tends to hold in the labor economics literature on workers and firms in the private sector (see e.g. Mendes et al. ,
2010; Card et al. , 2013, 2015; Goldschmidt & Schmieder, 2015; Shelef & Nugyen-Chyung, 2015; Alvarez et al. , 2016; Bloom et al.
, 2016, 2017). In the public sector there are additional institutional reasons to expect these assumptions to hold.
4By shedding light on the channels through which successful auctioneers in the public sector achieve lower prices, this
evidence complements an innovative paper by Lacetera et al. (2016) studying auctioneers in U.S. used-car wholesale auctions.
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Third, our difference-in-differences analysis of Russia’s “buy local” policy shows that, on average,
the asymmetric procurement rules procurers are asked to implement achieve the government goal of
channeling demand to domestic manufacturers. They do so at no cost to the government in that average
prices paid are unaffected. In this sense, our results suggest that industrial policies of the form we study
may be more successful in countries with low average bureaucratic effectiveness.5
Fourth, interacting the “buy local” policy with our estimates of bureaucrats’ and organizations’ ef-
fectiveness reveals that the average treatment effect masks considerable heterogeneity across the range
of policy implementer effectiveness. The prices achieved by ineffective procurers decrease by about 15
percent when preferences apply, while the prices achieved by effective procurers increase by a simi-
lar magnitude. As our conceptual framework shows, heterogeneous policy effects across the range of
procurer effectiveness can arise through the same underlying channel as the variation in general pro-
curement effectiveness: individuals’ and organizations’ influence on entry costs. Intuitively, tilting the
playing field in the auction in favor of local manufacturers is particularly effective at encouraging their
entry when baseline participation is lowest since this is when a new entrant faces fewest incumbent
competitors. Overall our results indicate that whether the benefit of distorting competition in public
procurement—increased entry by favored firms—outweighs the costs fundamentally depends on how
effective procurers are at attracting bidders. More generally, the results show that the design of optimal
procurement policy depends on the effectiveness of the procurers at implementing policy.
This paper contributes to the literatures on the causes and consequences of state effectiveness; context-
specific policy design; and methods for estimating productivity. We demonstrate that state effectiveness
is to a considerable extent embodied in the bureaucratic apparatus. In this sense our paper is most closely
related to an innovative study by Bertrand et al. (2016), which analyzes how the incentives of elite bu-
reaucrats in India matter for perceived performance and aggregate outcomes, and the literature on the
role of management practices in public organizations (see e.g. Rasul & Rogger, forthcoming; Bloom et al.
, 2015a,b,c).6 The approach we take—decomposing the total variation across the entire public sector in
a particular form of public sector output—has three advantages. First, it allows us to compare workers
and organizations pursuing a single objective, assuaging concerns that state actors that perform well in
one dimension may perform worse in unobserved dimensions. Second, it allows us to quantify policy
implementers’ influence on public sector output relative to that of other determinants. Finally, our approach
yields measures of individuals’ and organizations’ task-specific effectiveness that can be used to study
how optimal policy design depends on bureaucratic effectiveness.7
5The average treatment effect of Russia’s “buy local” program contrasts with the effect of similar policies found in higher
state effectiveness contexts. For example, a five percent bid preference for small businesses in Californian road construction
procurement is estimated to increase average costs by 1–4 percent (Marion, 2007; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2011).
6Burgess et al. (2012); Duflo et al. (2013); Khan et al. (2016); Callen et al. (2016a,b); Deserranno (2016) also present important
evidence on how performance incentives affect public sector workers’ performance. There is also an influential literature on
the characteristics of front-line public sector workers and public goods provision (see footnote 1).
7In this sense our paper is related to Yao & Zhang (2015) who estimate the share of the variance in cities’ economic growth
in China attributable to mayors. Their study belongs to an important body of work analyzing how public sector managers and
politicians matter for aggregate economic outcomes (Jones & Olken, 2005; Bertrand et al. , 2016; Xu, 2017). While it is difficult to
rule out that leaders who improve aggregate economic outcomes perform worse in other dimensions and to compare leaders’
influence on aggretate outcomes to that of other determinants, aggregate economic outcomes are uniquely important.
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We show that the type of policy we focus on—“preferencing” a specific group of firms—is a much less
costly way to steer government demand towards domestic manufacturers when the entities in charge
of procurement are less effective. This part of our analysis builds on recent work starting to unpack
how policy should be tailored to context (Laffont, 2005; Duflo et al. , 2016; Best et al. , 2015; Hansman
et al. , 2016). We extend this literature by considering a new dimension of context—the individuals and
organizations that implement government policy; by focusing on a state activity—procurement—that
allows us to hold the exact task that the entities we compare engage in constant8; and by considering the
range of state effectiveness observed across Russia’s entire public sector.
The type of procurement policy we focus on is common world-wide and extensively studied in U.S.
settings.9 However, because the Russian version of the policy is turned off parts of each year and applies
to a subset of goods, we can quasi-experimentally identify its average treatment effect (ATE), as well as
conditional treatment effects (CTEs) by policy implementer effectiveness. In decomposing an estimated
ATE into CTEs that are specific to individual entities of a given level of a particular trait, we follow the
literature on heterogeneous treatment effects (see e.g. Heckman & Smith, 1997; Angrist, 2004; Deaton,
2010; Heckman, 2010). However, we are not aware of previous studies that consider treatment effects that
condition on an unobserved (and therefore estimated) characteristic such as effectiveness. Our approach
represents a new way to use an ATE of a government policy estimated in one setting to predict the effects
of the policy in another (see also Vivalt, 2016; Dehejia et al. , 2016).10
Finally, we develop a new approach to measuring workers’ and organizations’ effectiveness, or pro-
ductivity. Our starting point is the recognition that increasingly available types of data allow researchers
to (a) construct direct measures of productivity, and (b) to partition the exact activities workers and or-
ganizations engage in into comparable categories. We build on the seminal work of Abowd et al. (1999,
2002) (hereafter AKM) on private sector labor markets showing how worker and firm fixed effects can
be separately identified within sets connected by worker mobility.11 We show that the AKM method
can be used to estimate measures of productivity that are free of the confounds that arise from existing
productivity-estimation methods’ (i) comparison of workers and/or organizations (e.g. firms) engaged
in different tasks and (ii) use of wage and profits data as outcomes.12
8We follow novel papers by Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2016) and Andreyanov et al. (2016) in studying procurement in
Russia. They focus on procurement contracts inferred from observed bank transfers and awards of large contracts through
“subjective” channels respectively. We instead focus on purchases made via the blind, anonymous, descending auctions used
for purchases of off-the-shelf goods in Russia.
9See McAfee & McMillan (1989); Marion (2007); Krasnokutskaya & Seim (2011); Athey et al. (2013); Bhattacharya et al.
(2014) on asymmetric auction rules and theory’s ambiguous prediction for how prices respond, and, among others, Samuelson
(1985); Levin & Smith (1994); Bulow & Klemperer (1996); Gentry & Li (2014); Branzoli & Decarolis (2015) on participation costs,
entry, and prices achieved in auctions more generally.
10The heterogeneity in CTEs we find resonates with recent studies comparing program effects across branches of companies
or private-versus-public status of the implementing agency (see Bold et al. , 2013; Allcott, 2015).
11Abowd et al. (1999, 2002) spawned a large empirical literature using employer–employee matched datasets to address a
range of important questions in labor economics. See, among many others, the papers cited in footnote 3. See also Bertrand &
Schoar (2003) and the literature that followed on CEO effects.
12Wages do not necessarily reflect productivity (Eeckhout & Kircher, 2011; Card et al. , 2015), but are important objects in and
of themselves. Existing applications of the AKM method have used samples that include workers performing many different
tasks. Carneiro et al. (2012) and Cardoso et al. (2016) show the potential importance of accounting for differences in tasks. On
the organization/firm side, conventional methods estimate productivity from revenue or profits data and thus risk conflating
productivity with mark-ups and quality differentiation (see e.g. Goldberg & De Loecker, 2014).
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To apply our method in the Russian procurement setting, we first use machine learning methods
and the text of procurement contracts to assign purchases to narrow product categories while maintain-
ing generality by not restricting the sample to very specific types of goods. This allows us to compare
procurers purchasing the same good.13 We then show how fixed-effect estimates of individual and orga-
nization effects can be corrected for sampling error (Neyman & Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2000). Specifically,
we adapt split-sample (see e.g. Finkelstein et al. , 2016; Silver, 2016) and “shrinkage” (Kane & Staiger,
2008; Chetty et al. , 2014a) methods to a two-dimensional fixed effects context.14 Finally, we show that
even in settings in which worker (and/or organization) mobility does not link all organizations—a chal-
lenge that will arise in many settings where AKM can be used to estimate productivity—(i) a suitable
normalization of the fixed effects allows us to estimate a lower bound on the shares of the variance in
productivity explained by workers and organizations and (ii) that the combined productivity effect of
pairs of workers and organizations can nevertheless be identified.15
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an endogenous entry procurement
model with variation in bureaucratic effectiveness that guides our analysis. Background on the Russian
public procurement system and information on the data we use is in sections 3 and 4. In Section 5, we
estimate the effectiveness of individual bureaucrats and organizations and their contribution to public
sector output. In Section 6 we analyze the impact of the “buy local” policy and its interaction with
procurer effectiveness. Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section we present a stylized model of public procurement in which two potential suppliers
choose whether to try to sell an item to the government. The government uses an auction to award
the contract and determine the price paid. Suppliers must pay an entry cost to enter the auction; these
entry costs serve as our reduced-form device for modeling state effectiveness. In Sub-section 2.1 we
trace out how the level of state effectiveness affects supplier participation and prices achieved. Then,
in Sub-section 2.2, we show how introducing bid preferences for favored suppliers can have opposite
consequences depending on whether state effectiveness is high or low.
13The method we develop ensures that within-category quality differences are minimal. The difficulty of categorizing goods
accurately so as to ensure like for like comparisons has long dogged several literatures. In foregoing conventional methods
and instead using text analysis to classify goods, our study relates to Hoberg & Phillips (2016). Their text classification method
has similarities to ours, but differs in that they classify firm similarity based on text listing the various goods firms produce,
whereas we classify good similarity based on text listing words describing items. We also carry out a battery of tests that relax
the within-category homogeneity assumption.
14To our knowledge, two-dimensional shrinkage estimators like the ones we develop have not been used before.
15In the type of setting/data AKM has been applied to in the existing literature—private sector wages—worker mobility
is often high enough that almost all workers and firms belong to the biggest connected set, particularly if workers and firms
engaged in different tasks are compared. This paper is to our knowledge the first to estimate effects attributable to workers
and organizations in the public sector, where mobility is lower. Limited connectivity issues likely arise in many settings where
our productivity-estimation method can be fruitfully applied, e.g. where some, but not all, firms engage in the same activity.
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2.1 A simple model of procurement with endogenous entry
Consider a government wishing to purchase an item from one of two potential suppliers. To make the
purchase, the government uses a second-price descending auction with a publicly announced maximum
price normalized to 1. In order to participate in the auction, bidders must pay a participation cost of c.
This c represents the direct costs of preparing the technical and other documents required to participate,
the liquidity costs of paying the deposit for participation, and the cost of attending the online auction. c
may also include side payments to the procurer.
In the first stage of the procurement process, the two potential suppliers, F and L, observe the an-
nouncement of the item to be procured and the participation cost c, and each supplier privately learns
her cost of fulfilling the contract, vi, i = F ,L. The suppliers’ fulfillment costs are independently dis-
tributed, but bidder F is, on average, more efficient than bidder L. To capture this as simply as possible,
we assume that both bidders’ fulfillment costs are uniformly distributed with CDFs GF (vF ) = U [0, 1]
and GL (vL) = U [µ, 1], where 0 < µ < 1.16 Upon learning their fulfillment cost, the suppliers simultane-
ously decide whether or not to pay the entry cost and enter the auction.
In the second stage of the procurement process, if only one supplier chose to enter the auction, she is
awarded the contract at the maximum allowable price of 1. If neither supplier chose to enter, the procurer
randomly picks a supplier and awards her the contract at a price of 1.17 Finally, if both suppliers enter,
the auction takes place.
The suppliers choose their entry and bidding strategies to maximize expected profits. Since bidder
valuations are independent, it is a dominant strategy for bidders to bid their fulfillment cost. Denoting
the bidding strategy of supplier i with fulfillment cost x by bi (x), we have bF (x) = bL (x) = x (see
e.g. Milgrom, 2004; Krishna, 2010). As a result, the winner is the bidder with the lowest fulfillment
cost; she receives the contract at the other bidder’s fulfillment cost. At the entry stage, we posit that the
equilibrium involves supplier F entering if her fulfillment cost is below a threshold value dF , and bidder
L entering if her fulfillment cost is below a threshold dL.18
We outline the equilibrium here, relegating a detailed characterization and the proofs of propositions
to Online Appendix OA. Working backwards from the second stage, we write supplier i’s expected
profits if she enters with fulfillment cost v and suppliers enter according to dF , dL as
Ui
(




v; dF , dL
)− qi (v; dF , dL) v (1)
where mi
(
v; dF , dL
)
is the expected payment supplier i receives if she enters with fulfillment cost v, and
qi
(
v; dF , dL
)
is the probability that supplier i receives the contract if she enters when her fulfillment cost
16The positions of the upper and lower bounds of the distribution are innocuous. Uniformity is a simplifying assumption
that allows us to derive simple, closed-form expressions.
17A more realistic assumption would be that auctions in which no firms enter have to be re-run at some cost. Our assumption
makes the model static, simplifying the exposition. The qualitative results are unlikely to depend on this choice.
18This is the equilibrium that the auction literature with endogenous entry has focussed on (see, for example, Samuelson
(1985), Krasnokutskaya & Seim (2011), Roberts & Sweeting (2015), Gentry & Li (2014)), though other equilibria may exist.
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is v. The probabilities of winning are given by
qi
(














i, j ∈ {F ,L}, i 6= j (2)
Since the bidding strategies are chosen optimally, we can use the integral-form envelope theorem (Mil-
grom & Segal, 2002; Milgrom, 2004) to rewrite expected net profits and expected payments as19
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v; dF , dL
)
v
The entry thresholds are pinned down by suppliers who are indifferent between entering and paying
the entry cost, and staying out and receiving the contract with probability 1/2 if the other supplier also
stays out. That is, the entry thresholds satisfy
UF
(
dF ; dF , dL
)− c = 12 (1− dF )1− dL1− µ (3)
UL
(
dL; dF , dL
)− c = 12 (1− dF )(1− dL) (4)
In this equilibrium, the expected number of entrants is









and the expected price the government will pay for the item is























which combines expected payments to the entrants with the payment in the case of no entrants.
The following proposition shows how the number of entrants and the price the government pays
relate to the entry costs that procurers impose on potential suppliers.




< 0 & dE [p]
dc
> 0 (7)
Proof. See Online Appendix OA.2.
2.2 Introducing bid preferences for favored firms
In the previous sub-section, while the suppliers were asymmetric, the government treated them symmet-
rically. In this sub-section, we introduce bid preferences favoring domestic manufacturers. Specifically,
19Strictly, Ui
(










x; dF , dL
)
dx. However, since a supplier with fulfillment cost of 1 never
makes a profit, Ui
(




if bidder F bids bF and wins, she only receives γbF , where γ ≤ 1, while if bidder L wins, she receives
her full bid. In this setting, it is optimal for bidder F to shade her bids so that what is received when she
wins is equal to her true fulfillment cost vF . As a result, her optimal bid function is bF (x) = x/γ. Bidder
L’s optimal strategy is still to bid her true value bL (x) = x.
In this case, the probability of winning is
qF
(














































but otherwise all the steps in characterizing the equilibrium are as before (see Online Appendix OA.3).
The following proposition summarizes the impact of introducing bid preferences favoring local prod-
ucts, emphasizing how the effects depend on the entry costs procurers impose on sellers.
Proposition 2. Bid preferences favoring local manufacturers have opposite effects for procurers who impose high
and low entry costs. Preferences lead procurers who impose high entry costs to attract more bidders and pay lower
prices, but lead low entry cost procurers to attract fewer bidders and pay higher prices. Price changes and changes
in participation rates are monotonically decreasing in baseline prices and participation rates, respectively.
Formally, (i) Let p (c, γ) be the expected price when preferences are given by γ ∈ (0, 1] and participation costs
are c ∈ [0, c], and let γp = argminγ p (c, γ) < 1 be the γ that minimizes prices for the buyer with the highest
participation cost c. Then for every γ ∈ (γp, 1), there exists a c˜p (γ) ∈ [0, c] such that p (c, γ)− p (c, 1) < 0 for
all c > c˜p (γ) and p (c, γ)− p (c, 1) < 0 for all c < c˜p (γ).
Similarly, let n (c, γ) be the expected number of participants when preferences are given by γ ∈ (0, 1] and
participation costs are c ∈ [0, c], and let γn = argmaxγ n (c, γ) < 1 be the γ that maximizes participation for
the buyer with the highest participation cost c. Then for every γ ∈ (γn, 1), there exists a c˜n (γ) ∈ [0, c] such that
n (c, γ)− n (c, 1) > 0 for all c > c˜n (γ) and n (c, γ)− n (c, 1) < 0 for all c < c˜n (γ).
Moreover, (ii)
∂p (c, γ)− p (c, 1)
∂c
< 0 & ∂n (c, γ)− n (c, 1)
∂c
> 0
Proof. See Online Appendix OA.4.
Intuitively, without preferences (γ = 1), high entry cost procurers depress entry and hence raise
prices. They do so particularly for local manufacturers, since local manufacturers tend to have higher
fulfilment costs and hence lower expected profits from participation.20 Then, when preferences are in-
troduced, this lowers expected profits for foreign manufacturers and so discourages their entry. On the
other hand, the preferences increase expected profits for local suppliers by giving them a better chance
of winning, and so encourage their entry. This latter effect is strongest for high entry cost procurers, who
20Formally, we show in Online Appendix OA.3 that the entry thresholds of the foreign and local bidder satisfy dF − γdL =√
2γcµ. Hence, the gap between the foreign and local bidders’ entry thresholds is increasing in c.
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were suppressing entry by local bidders the most in the absence of preferences. For high cost procurers,
the net effect is to increase participation and lower prices. Conversely, for low cost procurers, the net
effect is to decrease participation and increase prices.
3 Public Procurement in Russia
3.1 A decentralized system with centralized rules
In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and alongside the creation of market institutions,
the Russian government created the institutional capacity to perform public procurement. As with most
other state institutions, the system created was, and remains, extremely decentralized.21 Each govern-
ment entity has the legal authority to make its own purchases and there are no centralized purchases
(such as framework contracts).
While the legal authority to make purchases is decentralized, the legal framework governing pro-
curement is centralized. Competitive bidding for all purchases above USD 35,000 became mandatory
in 1997, and on January 1, 2006, the procurement rules and regulations governing tender processes at
all levels of government were harmonized by Federal Law No. 94-FZ (Yakovlev et al. , 2010; Krylova &
Settles, 2011). New provisions assigned criminal and administrative liability for individuals and legal
entities violating anti-monopoly legislation. In addition, a key innovation of the law was the creation
of a centralized official procurement website (http://zakupki.gov.ru/), launched on January 1, 2011,
which provides comprehensive information to the public and suppliers about all federal, regional, and
municipal level purchases. This website is our main data source.
3.2 Procurement of off-the-shelf goods through auctions
Public procurement makes up about 10 percent of Russia’s non-resource GDP. We restrict attention to
purchases of off-the-shelf goods through electronic auctions because it is then possible to compare pro-
curers purchasing the exact same good (after applying our good classification method), and because
bureaucrats and organizations may affect procurement outcomes along multiple dimensions in more
subjective procurement mechanisms, making comparison difficult. Electronic (open) auctions are used
for 53.5 percent of Russian procurement during our data period.22
Since July 10, 2010, all auctions have been conducted through one of five designated websites. All
announcements, protocols, results, and contracts from the auctions on these five sites are also housed on
the central nationwide procurement website (http://zakupki.gov.ru/). Figure 1 traces out the steps
involved in a procurement process; we now go through these.
Each purchase starts with an auction announcement. Our data, described in detail in Section 4, con-
tains 5,054,498 announcements. The announcement contains technical details on the item(s) to be pur-
21The Soviet Union, like other socialist states (see e.g. Bai & Jia, 2016), operated a centralized bureaucracy (see e.g. Chere-
mukhin et al. , 2016). Since 1991, the Russian bureaucracy has become very decentralized (Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007).
22The other three main procurement mechanisms are open tenders (19.8 percent), open requests for quotations (2.3 percent),
and single source procurement (21.3 percent). Online Appendix Table OA.3 shows usage of these methods over time.
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chased, a maximum allowable price for the lot, the required security deposit (between 0.5 and 5 percent
of the maximum price), other participation requirements, and the date of the electronic auction. In order
to participate in an auction, suppliers must first obtain accreditation. This requires not being in a state
of bankruptcy, not being sanctioned under administrative law, not having substantial unpaid taxes, and
not being listed in the registry of suppliers who have committed violations of procurement rules during
the last two years. To participate, suppliers must also submit the security deposit. Finally, suppliers
must prepare a formal application, consisting of two parts. The first part describes the good that they
are offering to fulfill the procurement order. The second part contains information on the supplier itself
(name, address, etc.). Importantly, until the auction is concluded only the electronic trading platform
has access to the second part of the application and the identities of the suppliers.
A five-member procuring commission designated to oversee the auction receives and evaluates the
first part of the application before the auction is held. Applications to participate in auctions are denied
if the supplier is not accredited, cannot pay the security deposit, or if its proposal does not comply
with the requested item specifications. In the event that only one supplier is approved to participate,
the auction is declared “not held”, the procuring commission receives the second part of the supplier’s
application, and a contract is drawn up with that supplier at the maximum allowable price. This is a
relatively common occurrence; in 1,344,825 cases, or 27 percent of the purchases we observe, there is
only one eligible participant. If there are no approved applicants, either because no suppliers apply or
because all applicants are rejected, the purchase is cancelled. This occurs in 13 percent of auctions.
If more than one supplier is approved, the auction is held. The eligible suppliers remain anonymous
and are each assigned a participant number. All participants log in to the online platform and participate
in a descending second-price auction. When a participant enters a bid lower than the current winning
bid, information on the amount of the bid, the time entered, and the participant number is immediately
made all available to all auction participants. The auction continues until ten minutes have passed since
the most recent qualifying bid.
Following the conclusion of the auction, the procuring commission receives and reviews the second
part of the applications. These contain the identifying information for the auction participants, but do
not allow for suppliers to be linked to the specific bids they submitted during the auction. The procuring
commission checks the applications to make sure the suppliers’ accreditations, licenses, names, tax ID
numbers, registration, founding documents, and documents confirming participation in the tender are
correct. Among the set of bidders deemed to be in accordance with the rules, the contract is signed with
the participant who submitted the lowest bid.
3.3 The role of bureaucrats and organizations in procurement
Public procurement purchases are made by and for a public sector entity that we will refer to as an
organization. The organization requests that an item be procured, accepts delivery of the purchased item,
uses the item, and pays for it. The organization may, for example, be a school, hospital or ministry, at
the municipal, regional or federal level. In order to make a purchase, the organization must pair with
a procurement officer—we refer to these individuals as bureaucrats—to help organize and conduct the
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auction. Bureaucrats can be either in-house employees of the organization or employees of an external
public agency whose bureaucrats conduct procurement auctions with and for multiple organizations.
Each regional authority sets rules dictating that the organizations under its jurisdiction use either an
in-house or external bureaucrat for a given type of purchase as defined by the maximum allowable price
of the contract and the nature of the item. In some cases such rules change over time.23
After Russia declared independence in 1991, the Soviet Union’s network of civil service academies
collapsed (Huskey, 2004), leaving academies to fend for themselves in a new market for higher educa-
tion. As a result, the education and labor market for procurement bureaucrats is extremely decentral-
ized.24 Individuals interested in working in public procurement seek out educational and employment
opportunities much as they would in the private sector. Interviews with experts and a review of recent
procurement officer job vacancies posted to open online job boards revealed that the primary require-
ments are simply a legal education and knowledge of the existing laws (94-FZ, 44-FZ, and related acts)
governing procurement. In all cases we are aware of, the procurement bureaucrats are paid a flat salary.
Since 2014, the division of labor between a procuring organization and a potential external bureaucrat
has been specified by law. The organization must submit all technical documentation, and choose and
justify a maximum allowable price. After this documentation is posted online, the organization and
bureaucrat together designate the procuring commission to oversee the auction process. The bureaucrat
is on the committee, except in special circumstances. The organization also signs the contract once the
winning bidder has been chosen. The external bureaucrat, with the help of the committee, is in charge
of first stage review of applications, the auction itself, and second stage review of applications.25 As far
as we are aware, the same or a similar division of labor between the bureaucrat and his/her superiors in
the organization applies when in-house bureaucrats are used, and also applies in purchases conducted
before 2014. There is thus wide scope for both the bureaucrat and organization in charge to affect how
the procurement process is conducted, and hence final outcomes.
Bureaucrats and organizations engaged in procurement of off-the-shelf goods have one simple man-
date: to acquire the items at the lowest possible price while following the government’s policy rules.
Other procurement policy goals the government may have—e.g. influencing which type of firms win
contracts—manifest themselves in the policy rules the procurers are asked to follow.
Both public procurement and Russia are generally associated with corruption (OECD, 2016; Trans-
parency International, 2016; Szakonyi, 2016). Corruption in procurement can take many forms, but al-
23External procurement agencies can be organized by a given authority (for example an education or health min-
istry/department), at the federal, regional, or municipal level. Part of the motivation for allowing the creation of public agen-
cies with bureaucrats who can handle purchases for multiple organizations was to allow different organizations purchasing
the same or similar goods to join forces so as to achieve lower per-unit prices. In practice, the decentralized management of
procurement in Russia and coordination required to co-purchase means that such joint purchases are very rare. Note that we
control for the factors that authorities with an external procurement agency use to determine whether an item can be purchased
by an in-house bureaucrat or must be purchased by external bureaucrats—the type of good and/or maximum allowable price
of the contract—in our empirical analysis below.
24 The Russian government has not adopted a single approach to educating bureaucrats nor does it operate a centralized civil
service administration to recruit, train, and assign public servants to postings around the country (Barabashev & Straussman,
2007). Examples of private academies offering trainings in the procurement sector include ArtAleks http://artaleks.ru/ and
the Granit Center http://www.granit.ru/.
25The one exception to this are “Kazennyie organizations”, which can delegate the process to a centralized bureaucrat.
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most all of them will result in a higher purchase price for the government, and as such will be captured
in our measure of bureaucratic effectiveness. For example, collusion between potential suppliers, or be-
tween potential suppliers and procurers, is likely to manifest itself in the price ultimately paid for the
items procured. If such collusion is associated with specific procurers, either because they are especially
corrupt or because suppliers take advantage of certain procurers, our empirical procedure will assign a
lower effectiveness score to those procurers.26
Our data allow us to directly address the two forms of corruption or incompetence that could un-
dermine our estimates of bureaucratic effectiveness. First, it is possible that procurers who achieve low
prices systematically purchase poor quality goods. In sections 4 and 5 we therefore develop and apply
a methodology designed to ensure that within-category quality differences are minimal. We also carry
out a battery of tests that relax the within-category homogeneity assumption.
Second, it is possible that procurers who achieve low prices systematically purchase items that are
not delivered. Our contract execution dataset is unusual, however, in that it includes information on
whether the organization paying for the items signed for delivery. Non-delivery is very rare.27 Russian
procurement laws do not allow for any form of renegotiation of cost of delivery—which is common
e.g. in works contracts (see e.g. Bajari et al. , 2014; Decarolis, 2014; Decarolis & Palumbo, 2015)—for the
off-the-shelf goods we focus on.
In summary, one form of corruption or incompetence that would invalidate our effectiveness esti-
mates —quality differences—can be directly addressed using text fields available on each item in our
data, and the other—non-delivery—is observable and very rare. We thus believe that our procurer effec-
tiveness estimates capture what a government cares about in the first instance: the price paid for goods
of specified quality that are satisfactorily delivered.28 Throughout the paper we remain agnostic about
the extent to which some procurers pay higher prices than others because they are prone to forms of cor-
ruption that manifest themselves in the prices paid and the extent to which they do so because they are
of lower ability.29 In the framework in Section 2, the two sources of supplier entry costs have the same
26It is also possible that some procurers systematically see their auctions won by suppliers that subsequently do not sign
the contract, either because the winners choose not to do so or because they are deemed by the procuring commission to offer
sub-standard goods. In such cases the contract goes to the second-lowest bidder. Since we observe both the bids and the
contract signed, we also observe the instances in which the contract is not signed with the lowest bidder; such instances are
rare, accounting for under one percent of purchases (see Figure 1). (Declining to sign a contract after winning an electronic
auction carries strict penalties for a supplier, including a three year ban from participating in future procurement processes).
More importantly, the outcome we focus on when estimating procurer effectiveness is the price ultimately paid for the item.
As such, the consequences of auction winners not signing the contract will be captured by our effectiveness measures.
27Less than one percent of the auctions in our sample suffered from “bad execution”. The data also include information
on early and late delivery. As discussed in Section 5, these are correlated with estimated procurer effectiveness, but can only
explain (or “offset”) a tiny fraction of the dispersion in price effectiveness we estimate.
28From a longer term perspective, governments may also care whether the “right” firms win contracts, but this possibility is
beyond the scope of our paper insofar as allocative objectives extend beyond a preference for domestic manufacturers.
29Bandiera et al. (2009) find that 83 percent of waste in Italian public procurement purchases is due to low bureaucratic
ability rather than corruption. They study purchases conducted via procurement mechanisms that allow a role for subjective
judgment by the procurers. The reason why Russia’s modern-day procurement laws force procurers to use the blind, electronic
auctions we study for purchases of off-the-shelf goods (see Online Appendix Table OA.3) is that the government believes
that such auctions are harder to corrupt than procurement mechanisms that allow a role for subjective judgment, such as
the “open request for quotations” studied by Andreyanov et al. (2016). In general there may of course be both advantages
and disadvantages to allowing procurers flexibility in the allocation of contracts (Hart et al. , 1997; Fisman & Gatti, 2002;
Schargrodsky & Di Tella, 2003; Lewis-Faupel et al. , 2015; Meng et al. , 2015; Andreyanov et al. , 2016; Duflo et al. , 2016; Mironov
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impact on the main equilibrium outcomes we focus on, namely supplier participation and the price paid.
3.4 Preferences for domestically manufactured goods
As part of reforms passed in 2005, the Russian government established a system to provide for special
treatment of—“preferences” for—some types of firms when they participate in electronic auctions and
open tenders. Firms that produce their goods in Russia received a 15 percent bid discount for parts of
2011 through 2015.
The “buy local” regime worked as follows. Each year from 2011 to 2014 a list of goods for which
preferences for domestic manufacturers was to apply was drawn up. The presidential order defining
this list was passed in May or June and remained in effect for the remaining part of the calendar year,
after which the system of preferences ceased to operate until a new list had been created for the following
year. The 2014 list was extended through December 31st, 2015; the only time during the period a list was
in effect for more than a year. As such, preferences were never applied to purchases conducted the
first period of each year from 2010-2014. Organizations filing procurement requests for any goods on
this annual list were required to publicly inform potential suppliers that preferences would be applied.
Preferenced goods spanned numerous categories, including automobiles, clocks, various types of food
products, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and textile and furs. The country of origin of a good was
defined as the country where the good was “completely produced”, or where it underwent “significant
reprocessing”.
For the preferences to apply, at least one application offering a foreign-made good and at least one
application offering a Russian-made good had to have been submitted during the first stage of the auc-
tion process. If the firm that submitted the winning bid in the electronic auction had offered a foreign
good in its application, then the contract it was offered to sign would be for 85 percent of its final bid.
4 Data
4.1 Procurement auctions data
Our data on public procurement auctions and final contracts comes from the Unified Register of Federal
and Municipal Contracts located at http://zakupki.gov.ru/. We use data on the universe of electronic
auction requests, review protocols, auction protocols, and contracts from January 1, 2011 through De-
cember 31, 2015. In all, we have information on 5,054,498 auction requests. Figure 1 presents a mapping
between our data and the sequence of procurement procedures described in Sub-section 3.2.
A great deal of previous research in economics has faced the challenge of assigning items to good
categories so as to ensure that quality and other differences within categories are minimal. Broadly,
three approaches have been taken: using hedonic regressions to estimate consumers’ demand for and/or
suppliers’ costs of producing good attributes (Griliches, 1971; Rosen, 1974; Epple, 1987); using product
codes provided by e.g. customs agencies to partition goods (Rauch, 1999; Schott, 2004); or restricting
& Zhuravskaya, 2016; Coviello et al. , forthcoming).
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attention to products that are by nature especially homogeneous (see e.g. Syverson, 2004; Hortacsu &
Syverson, 2007; Foster et al. , 2009). However, these approaches typically achieve good homogeneity at
the cost of losing generality.30 With our data, we are in the common situation that our most detailed
information on the goods is in unstructured text fields in the contracts procurers sign with suppliers
rather than encoded into product codes.31 We thus use text analysis methods from the machine learning
literature to assign goods to homogeneous categories (see also Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010; Hansen et al.
, 2014; Hoberg & Phillips, 2016).
Our method proceeds in three steps. First, we transform the good descriptions in our contract data
into vectors of word tokens to be used as input data in subsequent steps. Second, we develop a transfer
learning procedure. The procedure uses good descriptions and their corresponding 10-digit Harmonized
System product codes in data on the universe of Russian imports and exports to train a classification al-
gorithm to assign product codes to product descriptions. We then apply this algorithm to the product
descriptions in our procurement data. Third, for product descriptions that are not successfully classi-
fied in the second step, either because the goods are non-traded, or because the product description is
insufficiently specific, we develop a clustering algorithm to group product descriptions into clusters of
similar “width” to the categories created in the second step. Details are in Appendix OA.6.
4.2 Procurement of pharmaceuticals data
We collect additional data on procurement requests for pharmaceuticals, a type of good that is by na-
ture homogeneous and where items’ country of origin can be inferred using brand names (Bronnenberg
et al. , 2015). Russia’s government regulates the pharmaceutical market to ensure that certain drugs
are available and affordable, compelling manufacturers of these drugs to register them in a List of Vi-
tal and Essential Medicinal Drugs (LVEMD). This list includes information on each drug’s International
Nonproprietary Name (INN)32; the name and location of the manufacturer; date of registration; and
maximum price for sale on the Russian market. We use fuzzy string matching to combine the contract
data on procured medicines with corresponding entries in the LVEMD using each drug’s international
brand (trademark) name, active ingredient (INN), dosage (mg, g, mkg), active units (IU), concentration
(mg/ml, mkg/ml), volume (ml), and units (tablets, packages). This matching allows us to construct
barcode-level identifiers for drugs that we can use as alternatives to our text classification good cate-
gories, and to identify the manufacturer (and thus country of origin) for each pharmaceutical procured.
We restrict the pharmaceuticals sample to purchases of drugs we can match to LVEMD.33
30Generality suffers both from restricting attention to very specific types of goods, and, in a methodological sense, from use
of a method that is successful at creating homogeneous categories only being possible with unusual types of data.
31Note that we use the contract text since it describes the goods purchased—the procurer’s output—rather than text from
requests, which are one of the procurer’s inputs into the purchase.
32INN is a globally recognized term to denote the chemical substance of the medicine, see http://www.who.int/medicines/
services/inn/en/, accessed October 8, 2015.
33Cases in which we are unable to match a drug to the LVEMD can arise both because the medicine is not classified by the
Russian government as “essential” (i.e., covered by the LVEMD) and because sufficient information on dosage and quantity is
not available in the procurement contract.
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4.3 Supplier firm data
We also collected data on all firms that participate in any stage of the procurement process. The primary
dataset on firms is Ruslana from the Bureau Van Dijk (BVD) agency. Ruslana covers the vast majority
of registered firms in Russia that file financial information. All firms are by law required to submit
accounting data on an active basis. All statistics are standardized by the Russian Ministry of Finance
and provided to agencies such as BVD for dissemination to end-clients.
5 Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness
In a given policy environment—here, standard procurement rules that treat all suppliers equally—prices
vary dramatically across purchases within good categories. We begin our empirical analysis by investi-
gating how much of this variation in state effectiveness is due to the bureaucratic apparatus.
5.1 Empirical model
We model the final price paid in a procurement purchase as follows. An item i is procured by organiza-
tion j and a bureaucrat indexed by b(i, j). The log price paid is
pi = Xiβ+ α˜b(i,j) + ψ˜j + εi (10)
where Xi is a vector of item-level controls, including log quantity, good fixed effects34, month fixed
effects, and interactions between 2-digit HS product categories, years, region, and lot size35; α˜b(i,j) is the
bureaucrat effect, ψ˜j is the organization effect; and εi is a residual. If bureaucrats and organizations are








0 to be large relative to
the overall variance in prices.
In estimating and interpreting this empirical model, we face four challenges. First, identification of
procurer effects is possible only within sets of organizations connected by bureaucrats moving between
them. Second, estimated procurer effects can only be interpreted causally if mobility is conditionally
random. Third, we can compare procurers engaged in the same task only if our method for measuring
and defining the specific good purchased in each auction is adequate. Fourth, the estimated fixed effects
represent an accurate measure of a procurer’s influence on auction outcomes only if we can appropri-
ately address finite sample biases. We discuss the first two issues and then present our results; after
presenting the results we return to the third and fourth issues.
34Hereafter we refer to the goods categories constructed using the method described in Sub-section 4.1 as “goods”.
35By lot size we mean the maximum allowable price for all the items to be purchased in a given auction. We divide the
maximum allowable price into bins so as to allow our estimates of procurer effectiveness to capture the impact on prices of
the procurers’ choice of the exact maximum price posted. The interactions help address, for example, concerns that systematic
variation in the average prices of different types of goods across space, in combination with differences across bureaucrats and
organizations in the items purchased, confound our estimates of bureaucrat and organization effectiveness. Russian regions
are highly heterogeneous (Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Acemoglu et al. , 2011; Yakovlev & Zhuravskaya, 2014).
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5.2 Connectivity and estimation
Separate identification of the bureaucrat and organization effects is made possible by the fact that some
bureaucrats make purchases for multiple organizations, and some organizations use multiple bureau-
crats to make purchases. Organizations are linked to each other by bureaucrats who make purchases
for multiple organizations, allowing us to partition the Nb bureaucrats and Nj organizations into Ns
mutually exclusive connected sets, each of which contains all the bureaucrats and organizations that can
be linked by chains of bureaucrat “mobility”. As shown by Abowd et al. (2002), within each connected
set s containing Nb,s bureaucrats and Nj,s organizations, we can identify at most Nb,s +Nj,s − 1 linear
combinations of α˜b(i,j)’s and ψ˜j ’s. Within each connected set, the bureaucrat and organization effects
are identified relative to other procurers in the set and so must be normalized to enable interpretation.
This also implies that comparisons across connected sets can only be made relative to the normaliza-








, but not the
corresponding unconditional variance, and similarly for the organization effects.
Faced with this issue, previous work on private sector workers and firms has tended to restrict atten-
tion to the largest connected set, normalizing an arbitrary firm effect to 0, and estimating unconditional
variances.36 However, due to the decentralized nature of public procurement in Russia, lower worker
mobility in the public sector, and our focus on bureaucrats performing the same task, our data contains
28,147 connected sets, and the largest connected set contains only 10,854 of the 95,420 organizations in
the full sample. To maintain generality and representativeness, we conduct our analysis in two samples.
Our analysis sample contains all connected sets containing at least three bureaucrats and organizations af-
ter making the following restrictions. We remove any bureaucrat-organization pair that only ever occurs
together (as in this case it is impossible to distinguish bureaucrats from organizations), and similarly for
bureaucrat-good pairs and organization-good pairs. We also require that all bureaucrats and organiza-
tions purchase at least five items. In our second sample we restrict attention to the largest connected
set in the analysis sample. Table 1 compares the analysis and largest connected set samples to the full
sample. All three are broadly similar in terms of the mean numbers of applicant and bidders, the sizes
of the auctions, as well as item-level characteristics, such as quantity and price per unit.
In the analysis sample, it is natural to normalize the bureaucrat and organization effects to have mean
zero within each connected set and augment the model to include an intercept, γs(b,j), specific to each
connected set. We rewrite the model in equation (10) as
pi = Xiβ+ αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi (11)






















+ Var (εi) (12)
36An exception is Card et al. (2015) who study the largest male and female connected sets in Portuguese data, and who
normalize the average effects of a subset of firms in each connected set to 0.
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As shown in Online Appendix OA.5, the effects in this augmented model are related to the underlying
bureaucrat and organization effects by
αb = α˜b − αs(b) ψj = ψ˜j −ψs(j) γs(b,j) = αs(b,j) + ψs(b,j)
where αs(b) is the mean bureaucrat effect in the connected set containing bureaucrat b, and similarly ψs(j)
is the mean organization effect in organization j’s connected set. This allows us to relate the variances of
our estimated bureaucrat and organization effects to their variances within and between connected sets
using the law of total variance:
Var (α˜b) ≡ E [Var (α˜b|s(b))] + Var (E [α˜b|s(b)])














) ≡ E [Var (α˜b + ψ˜j |s(b, j))]+ Var (E [α˜b + ψ˜j |s(b, j)])





Equations (13)–(15) show that consistent estimates of the variances of the bureaucrat and organization
effects in (11) provide lower bounds on the variances of the true bureaucrat and organization effects in
(10), respectively, and that we can construct the variance of the total effect of bureaucrats and organiza-
tions using our estimated bureaucrat and organization effects and connected set intercepts.
5.3 Interpretation: do the estimated procurer effects represent causal effects?
Our variance decomposition method uses movements of organizations between bureaucrats and be-
tween goods, and movements of bureaucrats between organizations and goods, to identify how specific
bureaucrats and organizations affect prices. Identification therefore relies on these movements being
orthogonal to the error term in equation (11). To illustrate the possible sources of endogenous mobility,
we follow Card et al. (2013) and write the error term as consisting of five random effects:
εi = ηb(i,j)j + θb(i,j)g + κjg + ξb(i,j) + ζj + νi (16)
where g indexes the good being purchased. ηb(i,j)j is a bureaucrat-organization match-specific effect, and
similarly θb(i,j)g and κjg are match effects for bureaucrat-good and organization-good pairs. ξb(i,j) and ζj
are unit-root drift terms for bureaucrats and organizations respectively. νi is a transitory error term.
ηb(i,j)j represents price discounts (premia) that organization j achieves (suffers) when working with
bureaucrat b relative to αb(i,j) + ψj . Such match effects could arise if specific organizations work espe-
cially well (or poorly) with specific bureaucrats. Similarly, it is possible that some organizations and/or
bureaucrats are especially good (or bad) at procuring specific types of goods, which would be captured
by κjg and θb(i,j)g respectively. The unit root components reflect potential drift in the general effec-
tiveness of an organization or bureaucrat over time. Such drift could for example reflect the procurer
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learning how to achieve low prices, or potential bidders learning about the desirability of participating
in auctions managed by a particular procurer.37 The transitory term captures any remaining components
of the error term.
Stacking the N items, we can write the model in matrix form as
p = Xβ+ Bα+ Jψ + Sγ + ε (17)
whereB is theN ×Nb design matrix indicating the bureaucrat conducting each purchase [b1, b2, . . . , bNb ];
J is the N ×Nj design matrix indicating the organization purchasing each item
[
j1, j2, . . . , jNj
]
; and S
is the design matrix of connected set dummies [s1, s2, . . . , . . . , sNs ]. X contains the good category fixed
effects so that we can write Xβ = Gδ + X˜β˜, where G is the N ×Ng design matrix indicating the good
category to which the item being purchased belongs.
Estimating (17) by OLS will then identify the effects α,ψ, and γ under the following assumptions:




= 0 ∀j; E [g′gε] = 0 ∀i; E [X˜′ε] = 0 (18)
which together imply that E [s′sε] = 0 ∀s.38 These orthogonality conditions allow for rich patterns
of sorting of bureaucrats, organizations, and goods. For example, bureaucrats can move to the higher
performing organizations over time, or effective bureaucrats can move systematically to high (or low)
performing organizations, without violating (18). Similarly, especially effective bureaucrats and organi-
zations can specialize in the purchase of certain types of goods. What (18) does rule out is systematic
sorting based on unmodelled match effects. Such forms of endogenous mobility are a priori unlikely in
the institutional context of Russian public procurement (see Section 3). Nevertheless, we now explore
the possibility, following the existing literature, especially Card et al. (2013).
First, bias can arise if organizations choose bureaucrats to work with based on match effects (as in e.g.
Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994). Using (16), an organization that switches from working with bureaucrat
1 to bureaucrat 2 can expect the prices it pays to change by
E [p|b = 1]− E [p|b = 2] = α1 − α2 + E [εi|b = 1]− E [εi|b = 1] (19)
= α1 − α2 + E [η1j ]− E [η2j ] + E [θ1g]− E [θ2g]
+ E [ζj |b = 1]− E [ζj |b = 2] + E [νi|b = 1]− E [νi|b = 2] (20)
If organization-bureaucrat match effects influence organizations’ choice of bureaucrats, E [η1j ] 6=
E [η2j ]. To test for this possibility, we construct an event study tracking organizations that switch bureau-
crats. We define an employment spell as a sequence of at least two purchases an organization-bureaucrat
pair conduct together with less than 400 days between purchases.39 Wherever possible, we then match
37We assume that each of the three match effects has mean zero, and that the ζ and ξ components have mean zero but contain
a unit root. General time trends in the data will be captured by the month effects in X.
38As the dimensions of the matrices of fixed effects involved are large, rather than inverting a high-dimensional matrix, we
solve the OLS normal equations directly using the lfe package for R written by Gaure (2015).
39Appendix figure OA.2 requires spells to contain at least three days, and the results are similar.
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an employment spell (event time ≤ 0) with the earliest future spell (event time > 0) involving the same
organization but a different bureaucrat. This change of bureaucrats then constistutes an event (event
time = 0). We classify the two bureaucrats involved in the event using the average price they achieve
in purchases they make for other organizations during the quarter that the spell ends (for the earlier
spell) or starts (for the later spell). We assign this bureaucrat-average price to the relevant quartile of the
distribution of all bureaucrats’ average prices in the same quarter.
Panel A of Figure 2 presents the results. The horizontal axis displays event time, i.e. purchase dates.
On the vertical axis we display the average prices paid by the pair at a given point in event time, residu-
alizing out month and good fixed effects. We see that prices paid change sharply when an organization
switches to a less or more effective bureaucrat. In particular, the price changes associated with switching
bureaucrat quartiles appear symmetric: organizations switching from a bureaucrat in the first quartile
of prices to a bureaucrat in the fourth quartile experience a price change that is of opposite sign but
very similar magnitude to organizations switching from the fourth to the first quartile. These last two
observations together are compelling evidence against the possibility of strong or moderate sorting on
match effects ηbj .40
Another possibility is that organizations that become better (or worse) at procurement over time sys-
tematically switch to a different type of bureaucrat, or vice versa for bureaucrats. In that case E [ζj |b = 1] 6=
E [ζj |b = 2] in the example in (19). However, we do not see any systematic time trend in the trajectories
of switchers in Panel A of Figure 2, suggesting that drift in effectiveness and organizations switching
bureaucrats are uncorrelated.
It is also possible that fluctuations in the idiosyncratic error term νi are correlated with organizations
switching bureaucrats, if for example an unexpectedly high price leads organizations to replace their
bureaucrats. This would lead us to overstate the difference in the bureaucrat effects since E [νi|b = 1] >
E [νi|b = 2]. However, Panel A of Figure 2 shows no systematic “Ashenfelter dip” just before a bureaucrat
switch, suggesting that the transitory error νi is not correlated with organizations switching bureaucrats.
It is also possible that procurers specialize in goods for which they are better at achieving low prices.
In the example in (19), it could be that bureaucrat 1 is more specialized in the goods the organization
typically purchases than bureaucrat 2 is, in which case we would underestimate the difference in the
bureaucrat effects since then E [θ1g] < E [θ2g]. To test for this possibility, we construct event study figures
for organizations switching between goods and bureaucrats switching between goods by following a
procedure analogous to that for Figure 2. The results are presented in Online Appendix Figure OA.1.
Each panel shows the same general patterns as in Figure 2. In addition to alleviating any concerns due
to unmodeled match effects between organizations or bureaucrats and goods, this helps rule out the
possibility of strong or moderate correlation between drift in the procurer effects or the transitory error
and procurers switching goods.
Panel B of Figure 2 is identical to Panel A, except that we now depict the change in the number of
suppliers that participate in an organization’s auctions when the organization switches bureaucrats; the
intermediate outcome that we hypothesize is the primary channel through which procurer effectiveness
40If there was sorting on match effects, we would expect all switchers to display price drops and those moving from the first
to the fourth quartile to display a smaller price increase than organizations moving in the opposite direction.
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ultimately affects the price achieved. As in Panel A, the patterns in Panel B show no indication that the
identifying assumptions in (18) are violated. Taken together, the evidence presented in this sub-section
strongly suggests that the bureaucrat and organizations effects estimated using (12) can be interpreted
as individual and organizational sources of the prices the government pays for its inputs.
5.4 The bureaucracy’s influence on output
We now present this paper’s first main result: our estimate of the extent to which individuals and or-
ganizations in the state’s bureaucratic tier affect public sector output. Table 2 implements the variance
decomposition in equation (12) in the analysis sample. The first column shows estimates of the vari-
ances from using the raw fixed effects from (11). Relative to the total variation in prices paid (s.d. =
1.646, controlling for good and month of the purchase), the standard deviations of the bureaucrat and
organization effects in the first column are large, at 1.031 and 1.068 respectively. However, the two are
negatively correlated so that the joint effect of bureaucrats and organizations has a standard deviation of
0.876. This estimate becomes 1.036 if we add in the connected set fixed effects to capture the total effect
of procurers both within and across connected sets, as seen in rows 9 and 10.41 In Table 3 we repeat
the variance decomposition using only the largest connected set. The results are very similar to those in
Table 2. The standard deviation of log prices is 1.773, of which 1.063 can be attributed to bureaucrats and
organizations. Overall, our estimates thus imply that bureaucrats and organizations jointly explain 60
percent of the standard deviation of log prices paid. Bureaucrats and organizations each explain about
half of this total effect.
Column 3 of tables 2 and 3 presents results from an analogous variance decomposition, except that
we now focus on variance in the number of suppliers that participate in procurement auctions. The
results are similar to those for prices: the standard deviations of the procurer effects are large—somewhat
larger for bureaucrats than organizations; and bureaucrat and organizations jointly explain about half
of the total variation in supplier participation. This suggests that an important channel through which
individual procurers matters for prices paid is that effective bureaucrats and procurers lower entry costs
and attract more suppliers to their auctions, consistent with the conceptual framework in Section 2.
The model we have estimated assumes that the price achieved is approximately log-linear in the bu-
reaucrat and organization effects. In the Appendix we probe this assumption in two ways: by examining
patterns in the size of residuals across the bivariate distribution of the estimated bureaucrat and organi-
zation effects, and by reestimating equation (11) with fixed effects for each bureaucrat-organization pair
added. We find no systematic patterns in the residuals and that the improvement in the model’s fit from
adding pair effects is very small, indicating that our log-linear model is a good approximation to the
true, underlying production function.
41The variance of the bureaucrat and organization effects can be computed either across specific procurement purchases
(“across items”) or across pairs of bureaucrats and organizations (“across pairs”); we show both but focus mostly on the former
since the across item-variance is arguably a more precise measure (because it weighs bureaucrat-organization pairs more the
more times a pair appears together in the data). As discussed in Sub-section 5.2, it is well-known that the estimated covariance
term in AKM models is downward biased (Andrews et al. , 2008). We therefore do not emphasize the estimated covariance
between bureaucrats and organizations. Note, however, that the total variance explained by bureaucrats and organizations
combined should not suffer from limited mobility bias.
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As seen from the standard errors in columns 2 and 4 of of tables 2 and 3, the estimated variance and
covariance terms are highly statistically significant.42 One way to illustrate their magnitude is to consider
what they imply would happen if bureaucrats and/or organizations were moved from one percentile
of the effectiveness distribution to another, for example because of changes in recruitment practices,
training of existing bureaucrats, or improved management systems. As seen in Figure 3, our estimates
imply that moving all bureaucrats and organizations above the 80th percentile in (in)effectiveness to
50th percentile-effectiveness would save the Russian government 37.3 percent of its annual procurement
expenses. If the proportionate savings we estimate for such a decrease in bureaucratic ineffectiveness
in the analysis sample were achieved on all Russian public procurement, the government would save
about USD 69 billion a year (see Online Appendix Table OA.3). Similarly, Figure 3 shows that moving
only bureaucrats above 80th percentile-effectiveness to 50th percentile-effectiveness would save the gov-
ernment 9.7 percent of procurement expenditures. In the Appendix we compare our results to existing
estimates of the extent to which individuals and organizations affect output in other settings.
5.5 Like-for-like comparison
A possible concern is that the differences in unit prices we attribute to procurer effectiveness may reflect
not only differences in price per quality-adjusted unit, but also differences in the quality of the goods
purchased. To investigate this possibility, we first show that our findings are remarkably similar in a
sub-sample of goods that is by nature very homogeneous—medicines.43
As described in Sub-section 4.2, we extract each drug’s active ingredient, dosage, and packaging from
LVEMD. We use these characteristics to assign medicines to barcode-level bins. These bins, rather than
the text analysis method, are used to define goods categories and thus to determine which procurers
to compare, in the pharmaceuticals sample. With these goods categories in hand, we make the same
connectivity restrictions as in the full sample (see Sub-section 5.2). As seen in columns 4 and 5 of Table
1, the pharmaceuticals analysis sample is similar to the full pharmaceuticals sample.
When we reestimate (11) on the pharmaceuticals sample, we find that, as in the overall sample, about
half of the variance in prices that is not explained by which good is being bought or when is attributable
to the bureaucrats and organizations making the purchases. These results are shown in Table 4.
Another way to investigate if procurers we label “effective” purchase lower quality goods than pro-
curers we label “ineffective” is to restrict the sample to the items our text analysis classification method is
able to assign a 10-digit product code to.44 As seen in Column 6 of Table 5, the results from our variance
decomposition exercise are essentially unaffected by this sample restriction.
Finally, we show that (i) our results are robust to restricting attention to the most homogeneous types
of goods in the analysis sample, and (ii) that the results do not change as we allow the sample to include
42We discuss how these standard errors are estimated in Sub-section 5.6.
43This approach is inspired by influential earlier papers that focus on sectors producing especially homogeneous goods
(Syverson, 2004; Hortacsu & Syverson, 2007; Foster et al. , 2009; Bronnenberg et al. , 2015).
44The algorithm developed in Step 2 of the procedure outlined in Sub-section 4.1 assigns a 10-digit code to 63 percent of
the items in our analysis sample with high confidence. The remaining items in the analysis sample are also clustered into
homogeneous bins, but we cannot confidently assign a 10-digit code to these items.
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more and more heterogeneous types of goods. We split the sample into quintiles of good homogeneity as
defined by the commonly-used measure of scope for quality differentiation developed by Sutton (1998).
We then reestimate (11) on successive subsamples. The first five columns of Table 5 shows the results.
Column 5 includes all observations we are able to match to the Sutton (1998) ladder.45 As we move from
right to left, we restrict the sample to more and more homogeneous goods. As expected, the variance
of average prices paid decreases with good type homogeneity. However, the estimated share of the
variance explained by bureaucrats and organizations remains largely unchanged across the columns. In
Online Appendix Table OA.4 we repeat this exercise using an alternative measure of scope for quality
differentiation developed by Khandelwal (2010) and find the same result.
Overall, the tests discussed in this sub-section indicate that our measures of micro level state effec-
tiveness are not confounded by differences in quality or other characteristics of the goods procurers that
on average pay low versus high prices purchase.46
5.6 Finite sample issues
A separate set of estimation issues arise from sampling error in finite samples. As is well known from
the panel data literature, consistency of a single set of estimated fixed effects requires that the number of
observations on each group, rather than simply the total sample size, tends to infinity (Neyman & Scott,
1948; Lancaster, 2000). In our case, this incidental parameters problem is expected to lead the estimated
bureaucrat and organization fixed effects to be overdispersed. In the case of two sets of fixed effects, the
problem may be compounded by limited mobility bias, i.e. that the estimated covariance between the two
sets of fixed effects is negatively biased when the network of workers and firms (here: bureaucrats and
organizations) features few movers (Andrews et al. , 2008).47
We address the finite sample issues in three ways. First, when calculating standard errors for our
variance decomposition, we bootstrap so that we can take into account the patterns of correlation in the
residuals. We construct partial residuals i = pi − Xiβˆ and randomly reassign bureaucrats and organi-
zations to each observation, preserving the match structure of the observations. We then re-estimate the
bureaucrat and organization effects. We repeat this procedure 100 times, and use the distribution of the
estimates to compute standard errors. This approach has limitations48, but makes bootstrapping feasible
with our large dataset.
Our second method for dealing with sampling error is a non-parametric approach, similar to Finkel-
45We are able to match 73 percent of the items assigned an 10-digit HS code in Step 2 of text analysis method with the Sutton
(1998) ladder. We thank Eric Verhoogen for sharing the Sutton ladder data with us.
46Another possibility that organizations endogenously respond to the effectiveness of the bureaucrats available to them
by purchasing more/fewer, or different types of, goods. This would lead us to underestimate the true variance in procurer
effectiveness and its consequences.
47We are estimating models with three sets of high-dimensional fixed effects (for bureaucrats, organizations, and goods).
(The models also contain month dummies to control for common time trends, but there are few enough of these month effects
that “month-connectedness” is not an issue). To our knowledge, identification results for models with more than two sets of
fixed effects are not yet available (Gaure, 2013), and providing such results is beyond the scope of this paper.
48The procedure imposes clustering at the bureaucrat-organization level in the standard errors. Moreover, since we use
the partial residuals i rather than reestimating the full model on each iteration, we do not account for correlation between
bureaucrat and organization assignment and X. The procedure drastically speeds up computation.
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stein et al. (2016) & Silver (2016). We randomly split our sample in half, stratifying by bureaucrat-
organization pair. We then estimate equation (11) separately on each sample, yielding two estimates
(k = 1, 2) for each bureaucrat (αˆkb ), organization (ψˆkj ), and connected set (γˆks ) effect. The errors in the two
estimates should be uncorrelated, so we can create split-sample estimates of the relevant variance terms
as follows:
















j , αˆ2b + ψˆ2j
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Finally, we take a more parametric approach and estimate the variance components directly and use
these to “shrink” our fixed effect estimates, akin to Kane & Staiger (2008) & Chetty et al. (2014a). The
variance in our estimated fixed effects comes from two sources: the true, signal variance in bureaucrats’
and organizations’ effects, σ2α and σ2ψ respectively, and sampling error with variances σ
2
µ and σ2ω for
bureaucrats and organizations respectively. The variance of our estimated bureaucrat effects is Var (αˆ) =
σ2α + σ
2




= σ2ψ + σ
2
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Our bootstrap method to calculate standard errors yields estimates of the variance of the sampling
error for each bureaucrat and organization effect, s2b and s
2
j . We thus estimate the signal variance of




, where expectations are taken across bureaucrats and
with weights 1/s2b . The procedure for constructing the variance of the organization effects is anal-
ogous. With these estimated variances in hand, we can form the linear predictor of the bureaucrat
and organization effects that minimizes the mean-squared error of the predictions. Formally, we find










and analogously for λj , and our shrinkage estimators re-
place these terms with their sample analogues αˆShb = λˆbαˆb and ψˆ
Sh
j = λˆjψˆj
The results from our variance decomposition for prices and participation using procurer effect es-
timates that are corrected for sampling error biases using the split-sample and shrinkage methods are
shown in Table 6, alongside the estimates from Table 2. The split-sample estimates in columns 2 and 5
are very similar to the raw fixed effects estimates in columns 1 and 4. Using the shrunk procurer effects
yields standard deviations of the bureaucrat and organization effects are about 30–45 percent smaller,
relative to the total variation in prices and participation. However, the standard deviation of the joint ef-
fect of bureaucrats and organizations remains very similar to the raw fixed effect estimates, whether we
focus on the split-sample or the shrunk estimates. We conclude that our first main finding—bureaucrats
and organizations jointly explain half of the variation in procurement effectiveness in Russia, of which
about half is due to bureaucrats and half to organizations—is unchanged when we correct our estimates
for finite sample biases. Our estimates of the separate effect of bureaucrats and organizations is moder-
ately smaller when we do so.
5.7 Correlates of bureaucratic effectiveness
What do effective policy implementers do differently? In this sub-section we relate variation in individ-
ual bureaucrats and organizations estimated fixed effects, αb and ψj , to observed variation in behavior
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and intermediate auction outcomes. As discussed in Section 4, our data contains detailed information
on the evolution of each procurement process, from the initial request document, through the auction
itself, to the final contract signed with the supplier. Since we have many observables for each purchase,
we use regularization techniques to select the variables that are most predictive of the bureaucrat and
organization effects. We run bivariate regressions of the bureaucrat and organization effects on all pro-
curement process-related variables in our data, and then use a LASSO procedure to select which subset
of the variables to include in a multivariate regression (Tibshirani, 1996).49
Figures 4 and 5 show the results. The left panel of each figure shows regression coefficients from a
series of bivariate regressions of the bureaucrat (in Figure 4) and organization (in Figure 5) effects on each
of the selected observables alone. The right panel shows the coefficients from the multivariate regression
of the procurer effects on all of the LASSO-selected variables. To facilitate comparison, all variables are
standardized to have unit standard deviation. The coefficients can thus be interpreted as the effect in
standard deviations of the bureaucrat/organization effects of a one standard deviation change in the
measure of procurer behavior. Of course, the relationships displayed in Figures 4 and 5 need not be
causal, in part because we do not observe everything different procurers do differently.
Four key findings emerge from Figure 4. First, effective buyers encourage many and diverse ap-
plicants. Organizations who attract more applicants pay lower prices, and bureaucrats who pay lower
prices are more likely to award contracts to firms from other regions of Russia. Second, successful buyers
make the auctions accessible and predictable by setting low required deposits, and writing contracts that
don’t require further modification after being signed. Third, more experienced procurers and in-house
bureaucrats pay lower prices.50 Fourth, geography and level of government impact prices strongly. Or-
ganizations that are further from their regional capital, and organizations at regional and municipal (as
opposed to federal) level pay higher prices.
Overall, we conclude from these findings that a key part of what makes procurers effective is their
ability to reduce the barriers of entry to participate in procurement auctions, consistent with the predic-
tions of our model in Section 2.
6 Individual and Organizational Sources of Heterogeneous Policy Impacts:
the Case of Bid Preferences for Favored Firms
In Section 5 we held the policy environment constant. We varied the bureaucrat and organization in
charge of procurement, exploiting the thousands of quasi-experiments created by the movement of or-
ganizations across bureaucrats, and vice versa, to estimate how individual procurers affect public sector
output. In this section we instead hold constant the procurers in charge of a purchase. We vary whether
49More precisely, we use the variables with nonzero coefficients in the LASSO regression with the regularization penalty λ
that minimizes the mean squared error in K-fold cross-validation.
50For bureaucrats, early and late delivery of goods is correlated with estimated price effectiveness in the direction one would
expect, but these can only explain (or “offset”) a tiny fraction of the dispersion in price effectiveness we estimate. Importantly,
bureaucrats’ success rate at making purchases (the fraction of auction announcements that actually result in a purchase) is
uncorrelated with prices.
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a particular policy that is commonly used worldwide applies and study whether the impact of the policy
depends on the procurers in charge of the purchase. We do this for two reasons. First, if, as we argued
above, participation costs are a key way in which bureaucrats and organizations affect procurement out-
comes, then our conceptual framework in section 2 makes testable predictions for how the impacts of
policy changes should depend on bureaucratic effectiveness. Furthermore, the second overall goal of this
paper is to determine if there are policy design implications of micro level sources of state effectiveness.
6.1 Average impact of bid preferences
We first estimate the average treatment effect of Russia’s “buy local” policy described in Section 3. The
policy comes into effect each year in the late spring, covering a subset of goods that varies year-on-
year (albeit moderately so). These forms of variation allow us to estimate the policy’s ATE through a
difference-in-differences strategy. Because there must be a minimum of one bidder in the auction offering
a Russian-made good and a minimum of one bidder offering a foreign-made good for the policy to apply
our estimates should be interpreted as Intent to Treat (ITT) effects.51
We estimate the Intent to Treat (ITT) effect of the preferences policy in regressions of this form:
yigt = Xigtβ+ µg + λt + δPreferencedgt × PolicyActivet + εigt (21)
where yigt is an outcome for the purchase of item i, which is a good of type g, in month t. Preferencedgt is
a dummy indicating that g is on the preferences list in the year month t falls within, and PolicyActivet is a
dummy indicating that the year’s list of preferenced goods has been published and the policy activated.
Xigt are the controls we use in our estimation in the previous section, but for clarity we separate the good
and month fixed effects, µg and λt that capture time-invariant differences across goods and aggregate
price trends, respectively. εigt is an error term we allow to be clustered by month and good.
Table 7 shows the results of estimating (21) in the analysis sample. Recall that procurers’ mandate
is simply to acquire the items they purchase at the lowest possible price while following the govern-
ment’s policy rules. In Column 1 we see that the average effect of the preferences policy on the log price
achieved, controlling for month and good fixed effects and quantity, is a precisely estimated zero.52 This
is despite the modest decrease in firms participating in procurement auctions when the policy applies
seen in Column 3.53 In columns 2 and 4 we see that the results are similar if equation (21) is estimated
on the largest connected set sample.
Our estimates are valid estimates of the policy’s ITT under the parallel trends assumption that the
time trend of prices paid for preferenced goods would have mirrored that of unpreferenced goods had
51In the analysis sample we do not observe goods’ country of origin.
52Because yigt is the price paid, not the winning bid, in this regression, the estimated ATE captures the “automatic” savings
achieved by the government (in auctions won by a foreign manufacturer) from paying the winning supplier less than its bid.
More generally, both the entry and bidding (conditional on entry) behavior of favored and non-favored firms are expected to
respond endogenously to preference programs of this form. As is well-known, how prices are affected is therefore theoretically
ambiguous in general (see e.g. McAfee & McMillan, 1989; Marion, 2007; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2011; Athey et al. , 2013;
Bhattacharya et al. , 2014).
53Note that the estimate in Column 3 is only significant at the 10 percent level.
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the policy not been implemented. In our setting, the policy switches on and off multiple times, so a
violation of the parallel trends assumption is a priori unlikely. There are two main reasons why the
assumption might be violated. First, secular trends in prices may be different for the two groups of
goods. Second, seasonality in prices might be different across the two groups. Figure 6 presents time
trends of average prices in the two groups, allowing us to directly evaluate the assumption visually. We
see no evidence of differences in either secular trends or seasonality.
In the analysis sample we do not observe goods’ origin and so we cannot assess if the preferences
policy achieves the government’s goal of channeling demand to domestic manufacturers. In the phar-
maceuticals sample, however, we do observe where pharmaceuticals are manufactured. Since all phar-
maceuticals are preferenced, we cannot use variation across products in the application of the policy
in our analysis. To repeat the difference-in-differences analysis in the pharmaceuticals subsample, we
exploit the fact an auction must feature at least one domestic and at least one foreign manufacturer for
the policy to apply and redefine Preferencedg as equal 1 if the drug purchased is made both in Russia
and abroad.
Table 8 shows the results of estimating equation (21) in the pharmaceuticals subsample. The esti-
mated effect of the policy on prices and participation are similar to those in the analysis sample, but as
Column 3 shows, we find an increase in the likelihood that the winner is a domestic manufacturer. It
thus appears that the preferences policy achieves the government’s goal of purchasing more Russian-
made goods. This finding is noteworthy since shifting demand towards domestic manufacturers comes
at no direct cost to the government, as we saw in Table 7. This result contrasts with those from studies
of similar preference policies in the U.S. (see e.g. Marion, 2007; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2011). In this
sense, our estimates of the average impact of Russia’s “buy local” policy point toward the possibility
that industrial policies of this form are more successful in countries like Russia where bureaucrats and
organizations are on average likely less effective than in advanced countries, foreshadowing our findings
in the next sub-section.54
6.2 Bureaucratic effectiveness and heterogeneity in the impact of bid preferences
The framework in Section 2 predicts that the introduction of bid preferences for favored firms should
affect the prices achieved by low and high entry cost procurers differently. In particular, the framework
predicts that the beneficial effect on prices of higher entry by favored firms should dominate the effect of
lower entry by non-favored firms for high entry cost procurers—who have low baseline entry rates—but
that the latter effect should dominate for low entry cost procurers. In Section 5 we saw that effective and
ineffective procurers in Russia pay markedly different prices for the same goods in a standard policy
regime that treats all firms the same. We also saw that bureaucrats and organizations that achieve lower
prices are the ones who impose lower entry costs on firms. We thus hypothesize that bid preferences lead
to a decrease in prices when administered by procurers of low estimated effectiveness, but an increase
in prices when administered by procurers of high estimated effectiveness.
54Pinning down the longer-term welfare consequences of channeling demand to potentially less productive firms is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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To test this hypothesis, we interact Preferencedg × PolicyActivet in equation (21) with the estimated
procurer effects from Section 5 as follows:
yigt = Xigtβ + µg + λt + δPreferencedgt × PolicyActivet + γPreferencedgt × αˆb (22)
+ ζPreferencedgt × ψˆj + ηPolicyActivet × αˆb + θPolicyActivet × ψˆj
+ piPreferencedgt × PolicyActivet × αˆb + ζPreferencedgt × PolicyActivet × ψˆj + εigt
Tables 9 (using the full analysis sample and the largest connected set) and 10 (using the pharmaceuti-
cals subsample) show the results.55 Several important findings emerge from these two tables. First, we
see that the zero average price effect found in Table 7 combines a price increase when the preferences
policy is administered by effective bureaucrats and organizations and a price decrease among ineffective
procurers. The introduction of the “buy local” policy thus results in convergence of the price perfor-
mance of effective and ineffective bureaucrats, and effective and ineffective organizations. The estimates
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 and column 2 of Table 10 suggest that the explanation has to do with
the entry costs associated with procurers at the high and low end of the performance range. Ineffective
bureaucrats and organizations see an increase in firms participating in procurement auctions when the
preferences policy applies, while participation decreases in auctions administered by effective procurers.
In Figure 7 we investigate how the impact of bid preferences for favored firms on prices and partic-
ipation varies with bureaucratic effectiveness non-parametrically. The four panels depict the treatment
effect of the preferences policy on prices and participation for bureaucrats and organizations of each
decile of effectiveness, relative to the treatment effect for decile 1 (the most effective procurers). On the
horizontal axis we plot the average effectiveness within the relevant decile, and on the vertical axis the
corresponding (relative) treatment effect estimate. The estimated treatment effects decrease in magni-
tude throughout the observed range. The decline appears relatively linear, and somewhat flatter in the
middle part of the distribution for bureaucrat effectiveness than organizational effectiveness. An im-
portant take-away from Figure 7 is that heterogeneity in how the preferences policy affects procurement
outcomes is not concentrated among especially effective or ineffective procurers, but seen throughout
the distribution of effectiveness.
A possible concern with our heterogeneous policy effects analysis is that our estimates may be pick-
ing up differences in seasonality or mean reversion across different types of bureaucrats and organi-
zations. This would require time patterns across different bureaucrats and organizations to match the
timing of the policy in very unusual ways, but is nevertheless a possibility. Appendix Table OA.6 per-
forms two series of placebo tests to assuage these concerns. In Panel A we consider moving the timing
of the policy in each year forward by increasing numbers of months. We see that as the timing shifts
earlier, the magnitude of the triple-difference coefficients decreases, as we would expect, since we are
moving untreated observations in the spring into the treatment group and treated observations in the
winter into the control group. In Panel B we consider a placebo in which we imagine that the preference
policy did not apply in increasing parts of early 2015 (even though it did). The estimated placebo effects
55In tables 9 and 10 we use the shrunken estimates of the bureaucrat and organization effects. Online Appendix Table OA.5
uses the raw fixed effect estimates and shows very similar results.
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are insignificant in all but one of the twelve estimates.
In the pharmaceuticals sample we can test if the differential change in the prices achieved by effective
and ineffective procurers under the preferences policy is acccompanied by a corresponding differential
change in the probability that Russian manufacturers win procurement contracts. As seen in column 3 of
Table 10, this is not the case. This suggests that, from the perspective of a government trying to minimize
the prices it pays for its goods while simultaneously steering government demand towards domestic
manufacturers, a “buy local” procurement policy of the form used in Russia is a more desirable policy
tool when the procurers administering the policy are less effective.
One way to illustrate how much more desirable the preferences policy is when bureaucratic effec-
tiveness is low is to continue our counterfactual example from Section 5. Bureaucrats and organizations
above the 80th percentile in (in)effectiveness paid 17 percent less under the preferences policy for the
same goods. Suppose procurers in this group were moved to 50th percentile-effectiveness. Our esti-
mates imply that the preferences policy would then have led them to spend 3 percent more than they do
in the absence of the policy.
Our findings in this sub-section are consistent with the argument that individuals’ and organizations’
influence on auction entry costs are a key driver of bureaucratic effectiveness. As our model in Section 2
shows, heterogeneity in auction entry costs across procurers predicts that heterogeneity in the effects of
the preferences policy will follow precisely the patterns that we see: namely, that the policy will lead to
improvements in prices and participation when implemented by procurers with low participation and
high prices at baseline, while the opposite will be the case with ineffective procurers.
Overall our findings in this section provide the first direct evidence of the magnitude of the poten-
tial benefits of designing government policy with the effectiveness of those who implement policy—
individuals and organizations in the bureaucratic tier of the state—in mind. Our estimates suggest that
if policymakers want to steer demand towards domestic manufacturers using bid preferences, the size
of the optimal bid preference to apply is higher for a less effective bureaucratic apparatus.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented evidence that, contrary to the mechanistic view of the bureaucracy
taken by the existing literature, the individuals and organizations tasked with implementing policy are
important sources of state effectiveness. Bureaucrats and public sector organizations together account
for 60 percent of the variation in quality-adjusted prices paid by the Russian government for its inputs.
Consistent with our simple endogenous entry model of procurement, effective public procurers engage
in practices that lower entry costs for potential suppliers. Such practices matter not only in a constant
policy environment, but also for the impact of policy changes. Studying the impact of a “buy local” pol-
icy that favors bids from domestic manufacturers, we find that the induced increase in entry by domestic
suppliers outweighs the tilting of the playing field against foreign manufacturers for ineffective procur-
ers, who have low baseline entry rates. The opposite is true for effective bureaucrats and organizations,
as our conceptual framework predicts.
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These findings have important implications. First, they suggest that there are huge returns to the
state from employing more bureaucrats at the high end of the observed performance range, training
bureaucrats better, or improving organization-wide characteristics such as management quality. For
example, our estimates imply that if the worst 20 percent of bureaucrats and organizations had 50th
percentile effectiveness, government savings would be 37.3 percent. The large magnitude of the procurer
effects we estimate suggests that the political leadership and front-line provider questions studied in
the existing literature on the state enterprise may have been over-emphasized relative to the middle,
bureaucratic tier of the state.
A second implication is methodological. Our findings imply that in order to extrapolate an average
treatment effect of a public policy estimated in one setting to another setting, knowledge of differences
in policy implementer effectiveness across the two settings is essential. We show how bureaucratic effec-
tiveness can be estimated in baseline data and then used in the estimation of heterogeneous treatment
effects to guide such extrapolation.
Finally, our findings imply that policies that are suboptimal when state effectiveness is high may be
second-best optimal when state effectiveness is low. For example, our heterogeneous treatment effect
estimates imply that the Russian bid preference policy saved the least effective 20 percent of bureaucrats
and organizations 17 percent of expenditures, but that if this group of ineffective procurers had been of
median effectiveness then the policy would have led them to spend 3 percent more. Such dependence of
policies’ impact on state effectiveness may be part of the reason why many policies work well in some
countries or regions and poorly in others. An important take-away is that policies should be designed
with the effectiveness of the individuals and organizations that will implement the policies in mind.
Achieving the best policy outcomes likely requires both maximizing the effectiveness of the bureaucratic
apparatus and choosing policies that are tailored to the effectiveness of their implementers. However,
our results also suggest that the returns to tailoring policy to implementers’ effectiveness are likely to be
especially large when bureaucratic effectiveness is low.
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FIGURE 1: PROCUREMENT PROCESS FLOW-CHART














5, 054, 498 purchases































This figure lays out the stages of the process public procurement purchases of off-the-shelf goods through electronic auctions follow in Russia. Numbers are based
on all purchases made under laws 94 and 44 in 2011-2015. The stages are described in detail in Sub-section 3.2.
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Time (0 = last purchase with old bureaucrat)
Standardized Bidder Residuals
Panel B: Participation (N)
The figure shows the evolution of prices and participation around the times when organizations switch which bureaucrat makes purchases with and for them. Each
point on the horizontal axis represents a date when a given bureaucrat-organization pair makes a purchase together, with event time = 0 being the last occasion on
which the organization works with the “old” bureaucrat, and event time = 1 being the first occasion on which the organization works with the “new” bureaucrat.
The vertical axis on Panel A measures average residualized prices (log) paid by the bureaucrat-organization pair, while Panel B measures the average number of
residualized bidders participating in the auction by the bureaucrat-organization pair. Prices and bidders separately are residualized by regressing each outcome on
good and month fixed effects. We create a balanced panel in which we require each bureaucrat-organization pair to work together on two separate dates and each
bureaucrat to work with at least one other organization in the quarter containing event time = 0 (for the “old” bureaucrat the organization works with before the
switch) or event time = 1 (for the “new” bureaucrat the organization works with after the switch). Bureaucrats are classified into quartiles according to the average
(residualized) prices (Panel A) or average (residualized) bidders (Panel B) they achieve with the other organizations they work with in the quarter containing event
time = 0 (for the “old” bureaucrat) or the quarter containing event time = 1 (for the “new” bureaucrat).
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FIGURE 3: CRUDE COUNTERFACTUALS
Panel A: Moving Worst 20% of Bureaucrats to Median
Panel B: Moving Worst 20% of Bureaucrats and Organizations to Median
The figure shows the impact of two counterfactual scenarios on the distribution of our estimated price effects. Panel A con-
siders moving all bureaucrats above the 80th percentile of their connected set’s distribution of shrunken price effects down
to their connected set’s median. The dashed line shows the distribution of our shrunken estimates of the bureaucrat effects,
while the solid line shows the distribution that would result from implementing the counterfactual. Panel B considers moving
both all bureaucrats and all organizations above the 80th percentile of their connected set’s distribution down to the median.
The dashed line shows the distribution of bureaucrat-organization pair effects we estimate, while the solid line shows the
distribution that would occur in the counterfactual scenario. Overlaid on both panels are the implied aggregate savings.
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FIGURE 4: CORRELATES OF BUREAUCRAT EFFECTIVENESS
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The figure shows the results of regressions of estimated bureaucrat effects αˆb from estimation of equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi on observable
characteristics of the purchase procedure followed. The left column shows standardized bivariate regressions for each correlate individually. The right column shows
the coefficients from a multivariate regression of the estimated bureaucrat effects on all the correlates that are selected by a LASSO regularization procedure with the
regularization parameter that gives the minimum cross-validated error.
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FIGURE 5: CORRELATES OF ORGANIZATION EFFECTIVENESS
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The figure shows the results of regressions of estimated organization effects ψˆj from estimation of equation (11): pi = Xiβ+ αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi on observable
characteristics of the purchase procedure followed. The left column shows standardized bivariate regressions for each correlate individually. The right column shows
the coefficients from a multivariate regression of the estimated organization effects on all the correlates that are selected by a LASSO regularization procedure with
the regularization parameter that gives the minimum cross-validated error.
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 Preferenced − Unpreferenced
The figure shows a graphical analysis of the preferences policy over the period of study. The x-axis is measured in months, with dotted vertical lines indicating when
the preference policy became active in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 (the policy remained active for all of 2015). The solid vertical lines indicate when the policy was no
longer active in each year. The top panel shows residualized prices averaged over month for each treatment group. Prices are residualized by regressing the log price
on good fixed effects and the interaction between 2-digit HS Product categories, years, region, and lot size. We trim the top and bottom 1% from the residuals within
each treatment group and month interaction. The bottom panel shows the difference between the two treatment groups on a scale for the y-axis equal to one-half of
the standard deviation of the trimmed residualized prices.
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FIGURE 7: NON-PARAMETRIC HETEROGENEITY OF EFFECT OF BID PREFERENCES FOR DOMESTIC
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) Panel D: Heterogeneity in Effect on Participation by Organization Effectiveness
The figure shows results from a non-parametric estimation of the triple-differences equation (22): yigt = Xigtβ + µg +
λt+ δPreferencedgt×PolicyActivet+ γPreferencedgt× αˆb + ζPreferencedgt× ψˆj + ηPolicyActivet× αˆb+ θPolicyActivet×
ψˆj + piPreferencedgt × PolicyActivet × αˆb + ζPreferencedgt × PolicyActivet × ψˆj + εigt. Bureaucrat and Organization ef-
fects are instead binned into deciles and the decile dummies interacted with the treatment indicators PolicyActivet and
Preferencedgt and their interaction. On the horizontal axis we plot the average effectiveness within the relevant decile. On
the vertical axis we show the corresponding treatment effect estimate (relative to decile 1, which itself drops out). The top two
panels present estimates from using log price as the outcome, while the bottom two panels present estimates from using the
number of bidders as the outcome. 42
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
All Products Pharmaceuticals Subsample
Full Sample Analysis Sample Largest Connected Set Full Sample Analysis Sample
(1) # of Bureaucrats 123,099 35,774 12,980 6,015 3,070
(2) # of Organizations 95,420 43,385 10,854 3,653 2,131
(3) # of Connected Sets 28,147 605 1 1,476 122
(4) # of Bureaucrats with >1 Org. 14,742 11,008 3,490 1,168 1,146
(5) # of Organizations with >1 Bur. 57,382 36,859 9,758 2,334 1,713
(6) # of Federal Organizations 13,461 1,547 442 494 38
(7) # of Regional Organizations 25,980 15,126 4,749 2,661 1,742
(8) # of Municipal Organizations 55,979 26,712 5,663 498 351
(9) # of Health Organizations 14,378 9,355 2,105 3,266 2,050
(10) # of Education Organizations 50,616 26,008 6,778 126 69
(11) # of Internal Affairs Organizations 15,659 3,196 741 224 0
(12) # of Agr/Environ Organizations 1,682 447 51 2 0
(13) # of Other Organizations 13,085 4,379 1,179 35 12
(14) # of Goods 18,650 17,946 15,501 4,476 4,153
(15) # of Regions 90 90 62 75 69
(16) # of Auction Requests 1,733,422 1,149,496 368,072 85,240 63,540
(17) Mean # of Applicants 3.42 3.43 3.5 2.78 2.81
(18) Mean # of Bidders 2 2.01 2.07 1.87 1.89
(19) Mean Reservation Price (bil. USD) 34,512 38,059 59,488 56,398 56,760
(20) Quantity Mean 968 981 1,909 412 426
Median 20 20 20 40 40
SD 113,415 131,901 260,248 6,442 6,977
(21) Total Price Mean (bil. USD) 368 310 670 306 256
Median 8 7.1 11 13 13.9
SD 1,940 1,748 2,949 8,790 1,698
(22) Unit Price Mean (bil. USD) 324 275 597 726 86.7
Median 0.421 0.325 0.62 0.361 0.381
SD 52,394 61,274 27,275 114,142 1,413
(23) # of Observations 15,366,194 11,228,122 2,858,982 274,991 200,816
(24) Total Procurement Volume (bil. USD) 1,074 797 358 21.6 14.8
The table reports summary statistics for five samples. The All Products columns show statistics for purchases of all off-the-
shelf goods, while the Pharmaceuticals Subsample columns restrict attention to purchases of medicines. Full Sample denotes
all unpreferenced auctions. Analysis Sample denotes all unpreferenced auctions in connected sets that fulfill three restrictions:
singleton bureaucrat-organization, bureaucrat-good, and organization-good pairs are removed; each procurer (bureaucrats and
organizations) implements a minimum of five purchases; and connected sets have at least three bureaucrats and organizations.
Largest Connected Set is the largest connected set from the Analysis Sample (as measured by the number of organizations).
Organizations working in Education include schools, universities, pre-schools, and youth organizations. Organizations work-
ing in Internal Affairs include police, emergency services, local administration, taxes, and transportation. The Other category
includes funds, monitoring agencies, and land cadasters, among many others. All sums are measured in billions of US dollars
at an exchange rate of 30 rubles to 1 US dollar.
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TABLE 2: SHARE OF VARIANCE OF PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION EXPLAINED BY BUREAUCRATS AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS: FULL ANALYSIS SAMPLE
Prices (P) (s.e.) Participation (N) (s.e.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) s.d. of Bureaucrat Effects 1.570 (0.0381) 1.257 (0.0244)
(2) s.d. of Organization Effects 1.372 (0.039) 0.979 (0.0257)
(3) s.d. of Connected Set Effects 1.000 (0.0115) 0.523 (0.0108)
(4) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects Within CS (across pairs) 1.258 (0.00519) 0.895 (0.00315)
(5) s.d. of Total Bur + Org Effects (across pairs) 1.364 (0.00247) 0.913 (0.00295)
(6) s.d. of Bureaucrat Effects (across items) 1.031 (0.0462) 0.919 (0.0418)
(7) s.d. of Organization Effects (across items) 1.068 (0.0496) 0.888 (0.0468)
(8) s.d. of Connected Set Effects (across items) 0.555 (0.035) 0.302 (0.0147)
(9) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects Within CS (across items) 0.876 (0.0154) 0.642 (0.00654)
(10) s.d. of Total Bur + Org Effects (across items) 1.036 (0.00126) 0.710 (0.00358)
(11) s.d. of Y 2.417 1.355
(12) s.d. of Y | good, month 1.646 1.241
(13) Adjusted R-squared 0.955 0.837
(14) Sample Size 11,228,122 11,228,122
The table implements the variance decomposition in equation (12) using the estimates from equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi. The sample used is
the Analysis Sample (All Products) summarized in Table 1. Each observation is an item procured by an organization j and a bureaucrat indexed by b(i, j). Columns
(2) and (4) shows standard errors for the estimates in columns (1) and (3) respectively, estimated by bootstrapping 100 times. In Column (3), the outcome variable,
Participation (N), is the number of bidders. The s.d. of the bureaucrat and organization effects can be computed either across specific procurement purchases (“across
items”) or across pairs of bureaucrats and organizations (“across pairs”); the across item s.d. weights bureaucrats-organizations pairs more the more times the pair
appears together in the data.
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TABLE 3: SHARE OF VARIANCE OF PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION EXPLAINED BY BUREAUCRATS AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS: LARGEST CONNECTED SET
Prices (P) (s.e.) Participation (N) (s.e.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) s.d. of Bureaucrat Effects 1.803 (0.187) 1.282 (0.0564)
(2) s.d. of Organization Effects 1.499 (0.291) 0.970 (0.0689)
(3) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects (across pairs) 1.577 (0.00414) 1.155 (0.00281)
(4) s.d. of Bureaucrat Effects (across items) 1.287 (0.244) 0.883 (0.0813)
(5) s.d. of Organization Effects (across items) 1.241 (0.271) 0.792 (0.0823)
(6) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects (across items) 1.063 (0.00287) 0.656 (0.00216)
(7) s.d. of Y 2.683 1.364
(8) s.d. of Y | good, month 1.773 1.231
(9) Adjusted R-squared 0.959 0.828
(10) Sample Size 2,858,982 2,858,982
The table implements the variance decomposition in equation (12) using the estimates from equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi. The sample used
is the Largest Connected Set (All Products) summarized in Table 1. Each observation is an item procured by an organization j and a bureaucrat indexed by b(i, j).
Columns (2) and (4) shows standard errors for the estimates in columns (1) and (3) respectively, estimated by bootstrapping 100 times. In Column (3), the outcome
variable, Participation (N), is the number of bidders. The s.d. of the bureaucrat and organization effects can be computed either across specific procurement purchases
(“across items”) or across pairs of bureaucrats and organizations (“across pairs”); the across item s.d. weights bureaucrats-organizations pairs more the more times
the pair appears together in the data.
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TABLE 4: SHARE OF VARIANCE OF PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION EXPLAINED BY BUREAUCRATS AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS: PHARMACEUTICALS SUBSAMPLE WITH BARCODE INFORMATION
Prices (P) (s.e.) Participation (N) (s.e.)
1 2 3 4
(1) s.d. of Bureaucrat Effects 0.330 (0.0168) 0.786 (0.00907)
(2) s.d. of Organization Effects 0.282 (0.0134) 0.572 (0.00457)
(3) s.d. of Connected Set Effects 0.387 (0.0245) 0.217 (0.0028)
(4) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects Within CS (across pairs) 0.225 (0.00723) 0.626 (0.0022)
(5) s.d. of Total Bur + Org Effects (across pairs) 0.279 (0.0181) 0.628 (0.00427)
(6) s.d. of Bureaucrat Effects (across items) 0.191 (0.0149) 0.520 (0.00915)
(7) s.d. of Organization Effects (across items) 0.194 (0.0149) 0.449 (0.00911)
(8) s.d. of Connected Set Effects (across items) 0.201 (0.0133) 0.0823 (0.00224)
(9) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects Within CS (across items) 0.162 (0.00672) 0.518 (0.00193)
(10) s.d. of Total Bur + Org Effects (across items) 0.251 (0.0152) 0.519 (0.00467)
(11) s.d. of Y 2.048 1.204
(12) s.d. of Y | good, month 0.404 1.066
(13) Adjusted R-squared 0.997 0.849
(14) Sample Size 200,816 200,816
The table implements the variance decomposition in equation (12) using the estimates from equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi. The sample used
is the Analysis Sample (Pharmaceuticals) summarized in Table 1. The good fixed effects used when running equation (11) are here barcode-level and constructed
using the active ingredient, dosage, and packaging as described in section 4.2 (instead of our text analysis method). Each observation is an item procured by an
organization j and a bureaucrat indexed by b(i, j). Columns (2) and (4) shows standard errors for the estimates in columns (1) and (3) respectively, estimated by
bootstrapping 100 times. In Column (3), the outcome variable, Participation (N), is the number of bidders. The s.d. of the bureaucrat and organization effects can be
computed either across specific procurement purchases (“across items”) or across pairs of bureaucrats and organizations (“across pairs”); the across item s.d. weights
bureaucrats-organizations pairs more the more times the pair appears together in the data.
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TABLE 5: SHARE OF VARIANCE OF PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION EXPLAINED BY BUREAUCRATS AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS: RELAXING HOMOGENEOUS GOODS ASSUMPTION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 10-Digit Codes
(1) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects Within CS (across items) 0.789 0.801 0.863 0.865 0.847 0.817
(2) s.d. of Total Bur + Org Effects (across items) 0.927 0.966 1.053 1.007 1.027 1.008
(3) s.d. of log P 1.752 2.175 2.291 2.390 2.433 2.388
(4) s.d. of log P | good, month 1.271 1.444 1.532 1.574 1.599 1.526
(5) s.d. of Bur+Org Within Efs / s.d. of log P | good, month 0.621 0.555 0.564 0.549 0.530 0.535
(6) s.d. of Bur+Org Total Efs / s.d. of log P | good, month 0.729 0.669 0.687 0.640 0.643 0.660
(7) Sample Size 1,097,233 2,275,959 3,231,115 4,300,461 5,222,931 7,055,150
The table implements the variance decomposition in equation (12) using the estimates from equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi. Each observation is
an item procured by an organization j and a bureaucrat indexed by b(i, j). Column (6) uses the sub-sample consisting of all auctions for goods that our text analysis
classification method is able to assign a 10-digit product code to. Column (5) uses the sub-set of the sample in Column (6) that we can match to the scope-for-quality-
differentiation ladder developed by Sutton (1998). Column (4) removes the quintile with the highest scope-for-quality-differentiation according to the Sutton (1998)
ladder, Column (3) the highest two quintiles, and so on.
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TABLE 6: SHARE OF VARIANCE OF PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION EXPLAINED BY BUREAUCRATS AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS: ADDRESSING FINITE SAMPLE ISSUES
Prices (P) Participation (N)
Raw Fixed Effects Split-Sample Min MSE Raw Fixed Effects Split-Sample Min MSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) s.d. of Bureaucrat Effects 1.570 1.466 0.864 1.257 1.128 0.910
(2) s.d. of Organization Effects 1.372 1.356 0.816 0.979 0.860 0.661
(3) s.d. of Connected Set Effects 1.000 0.695 0.905 0.523 0.253 0.445
(4) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects Within CS (across pairs) 1.258 1.238 1.069 0.895 0.887 0.793
(5) s.d. of Total Bur + Org Effects (across pairs) 1.364 1.333 1.153 0.913 0.902 0.798
(6) s.d. of Bureaucrat Effects (across items) 1.031 0.988 0.664 0.919 0.794 0.744
(7) s.d. of Organization Effects (across items) 1.068 1.068 0.699 0.888 0.759 0.648
(8) s.d. of Connected Set Effects (across items) 0.555 0.506 0.527 0.302 0.250 0.274
(9) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects Within CS (across items) 0.876 0.859 0.819 0.642 0.629 0.612
(10) s.d. of Total Bur + Org Effects (across items) 1.036 0.997 0.974 0.710 0.677 0.670
(11) s.d. of Y 2.417 2.417 2.417 1.355 1.355 1.355
(12) s.d. of Y | good, month 1.646 1.646 1.646 1.241 1.241 1.241
(13) Sample Size 11,228,122 11,228,122 11,228,122 11,228,122 11,228,122 11,228,122
The table implements the variance decomposition in equation (12) using the estimates from equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi. The sample used
is the Analysis Sample (All Products) summarized in Table 1. Each observation is an item procured by an organization j and a bureaucrat indexed by b(i, j). In the
left three columns the outcome is prices achieved, while in the right three columns the outcome is the number of bidders. Columns (1) and (4) shows estimates form
using the raw fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) shows estimates from using the split-sample method. This method randomly splits the sample in half, stratifying by
bureaucrat-organization pair, and estimates bureaucrat and organization effects in each subsample. The variance components are then estimated as the covariances
between the estimates from each subsample. Columns (3) and (6) shows estimates from using fixed effects estimated using the shrinkage method to minimize the
mean-squared-error of predictions. This method uses the bootstraps to estimate the sampling error in each bureaucrat effect s2b and each organization effect s
2
j , and
the signal variances of the bureaucrat and organization effects (σ2α and σ2ψ respectively). The minimum-mean-squared error predictor for each bureaucrat effect is
then [σˆ2α/(σˆ2α + s2b)] · αˆb, where αˆb is the bureaucrat’s fixed effect from the decomposition in Column (1), and analogously for the organization effects.
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TABLE 7: AVERAGE EFFECT OF BID PREFERENCES POLICY FOR DOMESTIC MANUFACTURERS ON
PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION: FULL ANALYSIS SAMPLE
Prices (P) Participation (N)
Analysis Sample Largest Connected Set Analysis Sample Largest Connected Set
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Standardized Quantity −0.510∗∗∗ −0.552∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.019) (0.003) (0.004)
Preferenced (Good on list) −0.050∗ −0.043 −0.145∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.047) (0.040) (0.053)
Preferenced (Good on list) * Policy Active −0.012 −0.007 −0.050 −0.029
(0.025) (0.045) (0.047) (0.062)
Outcome Mean 5.69 6.26 1.64 1.68
Month, Good FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Product×Size×Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,017,045 3,973,832 21,017,045 3,973,832
R2 0.592 0.620 0.276 0.272
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table estimates the Intent to Treat (ITT) from equation (21): yigt = Xigtβ + µg + λt +
δPreferencedgt × PolicyActivet + εigt. In columns (1) and (3) the sample used is the combination of the Analysis Sample
summarized in Column (2) of Table 1 and treated auctions that those procurers carried out. In columns (2) and (4) the sample
used is the combination of the Largest Connected Set summarized in Column (3) of Table 1 and “treated” auctions that the
procurers therein carried out. The first two columns estimate the ITT on the log price paid (P); the second two columns
estimate the ITT on the number of bidders participating in the auction (N). An item has Preferenced (Good on list) = 1 if the
type of good appears on the list of goods covered by the preferences policy for that year. Policy Active = 1 during the part of the
relevant year that the preferences policy was in effect. The Outcome Mean is the mean of the dependent variable in the control
group, i.e. for goods that were not covered by preferences purchased during the period when the preferences policy was not
active. Month and good fixed effects are included in all columns, as are interactions between 2-digit HS Product categories,
years, region, and lot size. (We use “product” to distinguish the categories used in these interactions from the much more
disaggregate goods categories used for the good fixed effects). Standard errors are clustered on month and good.
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TABLE 8: AVERAGE EFFECT OF BID PREFERENCES FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCERS ON PROCUREMENT
PRICES, PARTICIPATION, AND DOMESTIC PRODUCERS WINNING: PHARMACEUTICALS SAMPLE,
ITT ANALYSIS
Prices (P) Participation (N) Domestic Winner
(1) (2) (3)
log Standardized Quantity −0.039∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Preferenced (Produced Russia+Abroad) * Policy Active −0.007 −0.028 0.036∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.028) (0.010)
Outcome Mean 6.27 1.89 0.32
Month, Active Ingredient FEs Yes Yes Yes
Year×Product×Size×Region FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 557,455 557,455 557,455
R2 0.943 0.326 0.581
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table estimates the Intent to Treat (ITT) from equation (21): yigt = Xigtβ + µg + λt +
δPreferencedgt × PolicyActivet + εigt. The sample used is the combination of the Analysis Sample summarized in Column (4)
of Table 1 and treated auctions that those procurers carried out. The first column estimates the ITT on the log price paid (P); the
second column estimates the ITT on the number of bidders participating in the auction (N); and the third column estimates the
ITT on a binary indicator for whether the medicine was produced by a domestic (Russian) manufacturer or not. Unlike in Table
7, we here define an auction as (potentially) preferenced (Preferenced (Produced Russia+Abroad)=1) if the relevant drug is
produced both in Russia and abroad (all medicines are on the preferences list). Policy Active = 1 during the part of the relevant
year that the preferences policy was in effect. The Outcome Mean is the mean of the dependent variable in the control group,
i.e. for medicines that were produced either completely in Russia or abroad purchased during the period when the preferences
policy was not active. Month and active ingredient fixed effects are included in all columns. Active ingredient denotes a higher
category above the barcode-level that does not use information on dosage, packaging and manufacturer. Interactions between
2-digit HS Product categories, years, region, and lot size also included in all models. (We use “product” to distinguish the
categories used in these interactions from the much more disaggregate goods categories used for the active ingredient fixed
effects). Standard errors are clustered on month and active ingredient.
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TABLE 9: HETEROGENEITY OF EFFECT OF BID PREFERENCES FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCERS ON PRO-
CUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION BY BUREAUCRAT AND ORGANIZATION EFFECTIVENESS:
ANALYSIS SAMPLE
Prices (P) Participation (N)
Analysis Sample Largest Connected Set Analysis Sample Largest Connected Set
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Standardized Quantity −0.481∗∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003)
Preferenced (Good on list) 0.044∗∗ 0.005 −0.040 −0.077∗∗
(0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.035)
Policy Active 0.023 −0.014 0.230∗∗ 0.261∗∗
(0.026) (0.043) (0.108) (0.124)
Bureaucrat FE 1.153∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.025) (0.094) (0.089)
Organization FE 1.185∗∗∗ 1.425∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.030) (0.096) (0.090)
Preferenced (Good on list) * Policy Active −0.114∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.034) (0.030) (0.043)
Bureaucrat FE * Preferenced (Good on list) −0.026 −0.061∗∗ 0.043 −0.028
(0.018) (0.026) (0.042) (0.045)
Bureaucrat FE * Policy Active −0.019 −0.051∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.087
(0.017) (0.019) (0.096) (0.103)
Organization FE * Preferenced (Good on list) −0.008 −0.064∗∗ 0.070 0.018
(0.023) (0.031) (0.043) (0.050)
Organization FE * Policy Active −0.023 −0.080∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.091
(0.019) (0.025) (0.099) (0.106)
Bureaucrat FE * Preferenced (Good on list) * Policy Active −0.183∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.055) (0.064)
Organization FE * Preferenced (Good on list) * Policy Active −0.164∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.040) (0.060) (0.075)
Outcome Mean 5.69 6.26 1.64 1.68
Month, Good FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Product×Size×Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Connected Set FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,957,594 3,973,832 15,957,594 3,973,832
R2 0.645 0.692 0.372 0.364
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table implements a triple-difference approach, interacting the Intent to Treat (ITT) from
equation (21) with the estimated bureaucrat and organization effects from Section 5. In columns (1) and (3) the sample used is
the combination of the Analysis Sample summarized in Column (2) of Table 1 and treated auctions that those procurers carried
out. In columns (2) and (4) the sample used is the combination of the Largest Connected Set summarized in Column (3) of
Table 1 and “treated” auctions that the procurers therein carried out. The first two columns estimate the triple-difference on the
log price paid for each item (P); the second two columns estimate the triple-difference on the number of bidders participating
in the auction (N). An item has Preferenced (Good on list) = 1 if the type of good appears on the list of goods covered by
the preferences policy for that year. Policy Active = 1 during the part of the relevant year that the preferences policy was in
effect. The Outcome Mean is the mean of the dependent variable in the control group, i.e. for goods that were not covered by
preferences purchased during the period when the preferences policy was not active. Month and good fixed effects are included
in all columns, as are interactions between 2-digit HS Product categories, years, region, and lot size. (We use “product” to
distinguish the categories used in these interactions from the much more disaggregate goods categories used for the good fixed
effects). Standard errors are clustered on month and good.
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TABLE 10: HETEROGENEITY OF EFFECT OF BID PREFERENCES FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCERS ON PRO-
CUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION BY BUREAUCRAT AND ORGANIZATION EFFECTIVENESS:
PHARMACEUTICALS SAMPLE
Prices (P) Participation (N) Domestic Winner
(1) (2) (3)
log Standardized Quantity −0.031∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Policy Active 0.018 0.098 −0.014
(0.012) (0.085) (0.013)
Bureaucrat FE 0.809∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.050) (0.042) (0.010)
Organization FE 0.803∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.048) (0.042) (0.012)
Preferenced (Produced Russia+Abroad) * Policy Active −0.010 −0.051∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.025) (0.010)
Bureaucrat FE * Preferenced (Produced Russia+Abroad) 0.056 0.148∗∗∗ −0.017
(0.047) (0.030) (0.020)
Bureaucrat FE * Policy Active −0.017 −0.024 0.001
(0.048) (0.046) (0.009)
Organization FE * Preferenced (Produced Russia+Abroad) 0.018 0.162∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.042) (0.031) (0.018)
Organization FE * Policy Active −0.003 −0.037 0.008
(0.049) (0.041) (0.010)
Bureaucrat FE * Preferenced (Produced Russia+Abroad) * Policy Active −0.430∗∗∗ −0.352∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.068) (0.035) (0.022)
Organization FE * Preferenced (Produced Russia+Abroad) * Policy Active −0.402∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.072) (0.033) (0.020)
Outcome Mean 6.27 1.89 0.32
Month, Active Ingredient FEs Yes Yes Yes
Year×Product×Size×Region FEs Yes Yes Yes
Connected Set FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 406,424 406,424 406,424
R2 0.954 0.430 0.587
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table implements a triple-difference approach, interacting the Intent to Treat (ITT) from the
equation (21) with the estimated bureaucrat and organization effects from Section 5. The sample used is the combination of the
Analysis Sample summarized in Column (4) of Table 1 and treated auctions that those procurers carried out. The first columns
estimate the triple-difference on the log price paid for each item (P); the second column estimates the triple-difference on the
number of bidders participating in the auction (N); and the third column estimates the triple-difference on a binary indicator
for whether the medicine was produced by a domestic (Russian) manufacturer or not. Unlike in Table 9, we here define an
auction as (potentially) preferenced (Preferenced (Produced Russia+Abroad)=1) if the relevant drug is produced both in Russia
and abroad (all medicines are on the preferences list). Policy Active = 1 during the part of the relevant year that the preferences
policy was in effect. The Outcome Mean is the mean of the dependent variable in the control group, i.e. for medicines that
were produced either completely in Russia or abroad purchased during the period when the preferences policy was not active.
Month and active ingredient fixed effects are included in all columns. Active ingredient denotes a higher category above the
barcode-level that does not use information on dosage, packaging and manufacturer. Interactions between 2-digit HS Product
categories, years, region, and lot size also included in all models. (We use “product” to distinguish the categories used in these
interactions from the much more disaggregate goods categories used for the active ingredient fixed effects). Standard errors
are clustered on month and active ingredient.
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A Appendix
A.1 Probing the log-linearity assumption
The model we have estimated assumes that the price achieved is approximately log-linear in the bu-
reaucrat and organization effects. A direct piece of evidence in support of the log-linearity assumption
comes from studying the distribution of the residuals across bureaucrat and organization effect deciles.
If the log-linear specification was substantially incorrect, we would expect to see systematic patterns in
the residuals. For example, positive match effects would lead the residuals to be large when the bureau-
crat and organization are either both in the top or both in the bottom deciles of effectiveness. Figure
A.1 shows a heat map of residuals for the analysis sample. The map reveals no clear patterns in the
residuals.56
As a further test of our log-linear model of prices, we reestimate equation (11) but include fixed ef-
fects for each bureaucrat-organization pair, allowing for arbitrary patterns of complementarity between
bureaucrats and organizations (see also Card et al. , 2013). If there are indeed strong or moderate match
effects that our model omits, then we expect this pair effect model to fit significantly better. The pair
effect model does not fit the data much better than our baseline model: adding pair effects decreases the
RMSE of the residuals from 1.322 to 1.285 and increases the R2 from 0.955 to 0.957, and the pair effects
have a much smaller variance than the procurer effects from the log-linear model (results available from
the authors upon request).
Overall, we do not find evidence supporting a rejection of our log-linearity assumption.
A.2 Comparison to existing estimates of individuals’ and organizations’ effects on output
How do our results compare to existing estimates of the extent to which individuals and organizations
affect output in other settings? While we are not aware of comparable estimates of the causal effects
of workers and organizations on output in a developing-country government context, several studies
are indirectly comparable. First, studying front-line service providers in rich countries, Chetty et al.
(2014b) find that increasing the performance of 5th percentile American grade 3-8 teachers to 50th per-
centile would increase the present value of their students’ lifetime incomes by 2.76 percent, and Silver
(2016) finds that improving the performance of American emergency room doctors by one standard de-
viation would decrease time-of-care by 11 percent. We find that the same (relative) improvement in
performance among Russian procurement officers would lower prices paid by 42.2 and 55.1 percent re-
spectively.57 However, teachers and doctors may differ from procurement officers in the complexity of
the job performed, motivations, and many other dimensions.
Second, in studies of workers in the private sector performing a simpler task, Mas & Moretti (2009)
and Lacetera et al. (2016) find, respectively, that increasing performance by one standard deviation
would decrease cashier processing times in a U.S. supermarket chain and increase the probability of
56Online Appendix Figure OA.3 shows the analogous figure for the largest connected set, again showing no signs of system-
atic patterns in the residuals.
57We perform these calculations separately in each connected set and report the average, weighting by the number of items.
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cars being sold in U.S. used-car auctions by 11 and 4.3 percent, while in our case the improvement is
55.1 percent.58 Of course, in the public sector, output is less easily measured and monitored, and so we
expect greater scope for differences between bureaucrats.
Third, while their estimates do not have a causal interpretation, and they do not separate individual
and organizational effects, Bandiera et al. (2009) find that Italian public bodies at the 90th percentile of
performance pay 55 percent more than those at the 10th percentile for 21 generic goods. In our context,
the bureaucrat-organization pair at the 10th percentile pays 75.3 percent less than the pair at the 90th
percentile. Our effects are larger, possibly reflecting the fact that institutional constraints on bureaucrats
and organizations are weaker in Russia than in Italy, or that we include a wider range of goods for which
bureaucrats and organizations have a greater impact on prices. We are not aware of any existing papers
estimating causal effects of individual organizations on output in either the private or public sector.
FIGURE A.1: MAGNITUDE OF PROCUREMENT PRICE RESIDUALS FOR PURCHASES BY BUREAUCRATS









































The figure presents a heatmap of averages of the residuals from the estimation of equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj +
γs(b,j) + εi. The residuals are binned by vingtiles of the estimated bureaucrat effect αˆb and organization effect ψˆj within each
connected set of organizations. The sample used is the Analysis Sample (All Products) summarized in Table 1.
58Bertrand & Schoar (2003) find that CEOs in the top quartile of performance achieve a return-on-assets that is about 200
percent higher than CEOs in the bottom quartile. In our context, bureaucrats in the bottom quartile save 84.6 percent relative
to the top quartile due solely to the bureaucrat effects.
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OA Online Appendix (Not For Publication)
OA.1 Detailed Characterization of Equilibrium Without Bidding Preferences
As shown in section 2.1, the sellers’ expected profits can be expressed in terms of their probabilities of
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(OA.2)
Integrating these probabilities we get the expected profits
UF
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(OA.3)
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And similarly for an entrant of type L with fulfillment cost v (where µ < dF )
UL
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(1− v) , if v ≥ dF
(OA.4)
To find the entry thresholds, we need to find the type-F supplier dF and type-L supplier dL who
are indifferent between entering (in which case they receive Ui
(
di; dF , dL
) − c) and staying out of the







That is, we need to solve the system of equationsUF
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)− c = 12 (1− dF ) 1−dL1−µ
UL
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)− c = 12 (1− dF )(1− dL) (OA.5)
Since each of these equations has two cases, there are potentially two solutions, depending on whether
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which characterize the entry strategies in this equilibrium. Given these, the expected number of
entrants in the auction is












we can also calculate the expected payments to each bidder when their fulfillment cost is v













1−µ , if v ≥ dL
(OA.10)
mL (v) = UL (v) + qL (v) v






2, v ≤ dL < dF (OA.11)
The ex-ante expected profits of the two bidders are therefore
































1− µ dv =
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Together, these imply that the price the auctioneer expects to pay is











6 (1− µ) (OA.14)
OA.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proposition can be shown by simple differentiation. Starting with the expected number of













which depends on how the entry thresholds change with c. Differentiating the expressions for the entry

















































showing the first part of the proposition. Following the same steps for the second part, the derivative of
the expected price is













































































)2 − (1− dF )2 + 2dL] > 0
where the last inequality follows since dF ≥ dL, completing the proof.
OA.3 Detailed Characterization of Equilibrium With Bidding Preferences
As shown in section 2.1, the sellers’ expected profits can be expressed in terms of their probabilities of
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1− dF , if x ≥ dFγ
(OA.18)
Integrating these probabilities we get the expected profits
UF
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1−µ , if v ≥ γdL
(OA.19)
And similarly for an entrant of type L with fulfillment cost v (where µ < dFγ )
UL
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(1− v) , if v ≥ dFγ
(OA.20)
To find the entry thresholds, we need to find the type-F supplier dF and type-L supplier dL who
are indifferent between entering (in which case they receive Ui
(
di; dF , dL
) − c) and staying out of the








That is, we need to solve the system of equationsUF
(
dF ; dF , dL
)− c = 12 (1− dF ) 1−dL1−µ
UL
(
dL; dF , dL
)− c = 12 (1− dF )(1− dL) (OA.21)
Since each of these equations has two cases, there are potentially two solutions, depending on whether
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2γcµ+ γdL = dF
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[(1− γ)−√2γcµ]2 + 4γc (1− µ)
2 (OA.24)
which characterize the entry strategies in this equilibrium. Given these, the expected number of
entrants in the auction is











we can also calculate the expected payments to each bidder when their fulfillment cost is v













1−µ , if v ≥ γdL
(OA.26)
mL (v) = UL (v) + qL (v) v






2, v ≤ dL < dF (OA.27)
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The ex-ante expected profits of the two bidders are therefore

































1− µ dv =
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Together, these imply that the price the auctioneer expects to pay is











6 (1− µ)γ (2γ − 1) (OA.30)
OA.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We will prove the proposition for the expected number of participants. The proof for the expected
price is analogous (but more tedious). To prove the proposition we proceed in three steps. First, we show
that for any level of entry costs c ∈ (0, c], there is a threshold γ above which introducing preferences at
that rate causes prices to increase, and below which prices decrease. Second, we show that this threshold
is decreasing in the entry costs procurers impose on suppliers. Third we argue that these first two steps
imply the proposition. Our first step can be characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let n (c, γ) be the expected number of participants when preferences are given by γ ∈ (0, 1] and
participation costs are c ∈ [0, c]. For every c ∈ [0, c] there exists a unique γ? (c) ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies
n (c, γ? (c)) = n (c, 1). Moreover, n (c, γ) ≤ n (c, 1) ∀γ ∈ [0, γ? (c)] and n (c, γ) ≥ n (c, 1) , ∀γ ∈ [γ? (c) , 1]
Proof. To prove this, we will show that n (c, γ) is unimodal in γ for every c. Differentiating the expected











Denoting the indifference conditions determining the entry thresholds (OA.21) by F , and applying the
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implicit function theorem, we see that the derivatives are given by
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Rearranging the indifference conditions, we can see that dF = γdL +
√
2γcµ, with which we can show















































Since the term in square brackets is always positive, the sign of this derivatives depends on the sign of
the first term. Since ∂dF/∂γ > 0 and ∂dL/∂γ < 0, this term is strictly decreasing in γ. Finally, we show
that this term is positive at γ = 0 and negative at γ = 1. To see that this term is negative at γ = 1 note
that




= − (dF − dL) (OA.33)
For any γ, dF = γdL +
√
2γcµ, so for γ = 1 we have dF − dL =
√
2cµ. This implies that
1− dF − 1− dL1− µ ≤ −
√
2cµ ≤ 0 (OA.34)
where the last inequality is strict whenever c and µ are non-zero. To see that this term is positive at
γ = 0, note that as γ → 0, dF → 0. Therefore, to continue to satisfy (OA.21), it must be the case that
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1− dF − 1− dL1− µ
)
= 1− 2c > 0↔ c < 1/2 (OA.35)
The final ingredient we need to complete the proof of the lemma is to show that there exists exactly
one other value of γ for which E [n] is the same as when γ = 1. To show this, we show that E [n|γ = 0] <
E [n|γ = 1]. To see this, note that at γ = 0 we have that
E [n|γ = 0] = dF |γ=0 + dL|γ=0 − µ1− µ = 1− 2c (OA.36)
At the other limit, when γ = 1, we get that
dF |γ=1 = 2+
√
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As a result,
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Comparing this to E [n|γ = 0], it will be sufficient if
2−
√
2cµ+ 4c (1− µ) > 1− 2c
↔ 1+ 2c−
√
2cµ+ 4c (1− µ) > 0
Since µ ∈ [0, 1],
1+ 2c−
√





c−√c) > 1/2 > 0
Combining all the pieces, E [n] is smaller at γ = 0 than at γ = 1 and unimodal in between, so it must
have exactly one intermediate γ˜n for which E [n|γ = γ˜n] = E [n|γ = 1], proving the lemma.
The second step is to show that higher-cost procurers have a lower γ?. The following lemma shows
this
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Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to the expression defining γ? (c), the derivative we are









By lemma 3, the denominator of (OA.38) is positive, so to show the lemma, we need to show that the
numerator is positive. For this, it will be sufficient to show that ∂2n (c, γ) /∂c∂γ is negative. To see this,
denote the indifference conditions determining the entry thresholds (OA.21) by F and apply the implicit
function theorem. The derivatives of the system with respect to the thresholds dF and dL are in the proof







Combining all the parts,
Dcd = −[DdF ]−1DcF
= − |DdF|−1
(
− (1− γdL)+ 12 (1− dF ) 12 1−dF1−µ





















































































1− dF − 1− dL1− µ
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− 2 [1+ γ (1− µ)]
]
All the terms in the square brackets are decreasing in γ, so we have shown that ∂2n (c, γ) /∂c∂γ is nega-
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tive, and hence we have shown the lemma.
From these two lemmas the proposition can be seen as follows. To see part (i) consider a particular
γ < γn. By lemma 3, n (c, γ)− n (c, 1) > 0 for all procurers whose entry costs c are such that γ? (c) < γ.
Conversely, n (c, γ)− n (c, 1) < 0 for all procurers whose entry costs are such that γ? (c) > γ. By lemma
4, γ? (c) < γ for all procurers with entry costs higher than c? (γ), and γ? (c) > γ for all procurers with
entry costs below c? (γ), where c? (γ) is the unique cost level satisfying γ? (c? (γ)) = γ. Part (ii) follows
immediately from the continuity of n (c, γ) in c and γ.
OA.5 Identification of Bureaucrat and Organization Effects with Multiple Connected Sets
As shown in Abowd et al. (2002), it isn’t possible to identify all the bureaucrat and organization effects.
In particular, they show that (a) the effects are identified only within connected sets of bureaucrats and
organizations; and (b) within each connected set s containing Nb,s bureaucrats and No,s organizations,
only the group mean of the lhs variable, and Nb,s − 1 + No,s − 1 of the bureaucrat and organization
effects are identified. More generally, within each connected set, we can identify Nb,s +No,s − 1 linear
combinations of the bureaucrat and organization effects.
To see this explicitly, write the model as
p = Xβ+ Bα+ Fψ (OA.39)
where p is the N × 1 vector of item prices; X is an N × k matrix of control variables, B is the N ×Nb
design matrix indicating the bureaucrat responsible for each purchase; α is the Nb × 1 vector of bureau-
crat effects; F is the N ×No design matrix indicating the organization responsible for each purchase; and
ψ is the No × 1 vector of organization effects.














As Abowd et al. (2002) show, these equations do not have a unique solution because [B F]′ [B F] only
has rank Nb +No −Ns, where Ns is the number of connected sets. As a result, to identify a particular
solution to the normal equations, we need Ns additional restrictions on the αs and ψs.
Abowd et al. (2002) add Ns restrictions setting the mean of the person effects to 0 in each connected
set. They also set the grand mean of the firm effects to 0. However, this makes it difficult to compare
across connected sets since all the firm effects are interpreted as deviations from the grand mean, which
is a mean across connected sets. Instead, we will add 2Ns restrictions setting the mean of the bureaucrat
and organization effects to 0 within each connected set. These Ns additional constraints also allow us
to identify S connected set means γs = α¯s + ψ¯s which facilitate comparison across connected sets and
allow us to interpret the variances of the estimated bureaucrat and organization effects as lower bounds
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on the true variances of the bureaucrat and organization effects.
Specifically, we augment the model to be
p = Xβ+ Bα˜+ Fψ˜ + Sγ (OA.41)
where S is theN ×Ns design matrix indicating which connected set each item belongs to; γ is theNs× 1
vector of connected set effects; and we add the restriction that α˜ and ψ˜ have mean zero in each connected
























where Sb is the Ns ×Nb design matrix indicating which connected set each bureaucrat belongs to, and
So is the Ns ×No design matrix indicating which connected set each organization belongs to.
The following proposition describes the relationship between these estimators and the bureaucrat
and organization effects.
Proposition 5 (Identification). If the true model is given by (OA.39), then αˆ, ψˆ, and γˆ, the estimators of α˜,
ψ˜ and γ in the augmented model (OA.41) that solve the augmented normal equations (OA.42) (i) are uniquely








where α is the Ns× 1 vector of connected-set bureaucrat effect means, and ψ is the Ns× 1 vector of connected-set
organization effect means.
Proof. We will prove each part of the result separately. To see uniqueness, first note that the standard
normal equations for (OA.41) only has rankNb+No−Ns. To see this, we note that BSb′ = FSo′ = S and
so 2Ns columns of the N × (Nb +No +Ns) matrix [B F S] are collinear. However, the 2Ns restrictions
Sbαˆ = 0 and Soψˆ = 0 are independent of the standard normal equations, so the first matrix in (OA.42)
has rank Nb +No +Ns and hence the solution to (OA.42) is unique.
To see the second part, it suffices to show that (OA.43) solves (OA.42). First, substitute the estimators
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From here, noting again that BSb′ = FSo′ = S; that Sbα is an Ns × 1 vector in which each entry is the
sum of the bureaucrat effects; and that Soψ is an Ns × 1 vector in which each entry is the sum of the
organization effects, shows that the two sides are equal, yielding the result.
OA.6 Details on Text Analysis
This appendix provides some of the details of the procedure we use to categorize procurement purchases
into groups of homogeneous products. We proceed in three steps. First, we transform the raw product
descriptions in our data into vectors of word tokens to be used as input data in the subsequent steps.
Second, we develop a transfer learning procedure to use product descriptions and their corresponding
Harmonized System product codes in data on the universe of Russian imports and exports to train a
classification algorithm to assign product codes to product descriptions. We then apply this algorithm
to the product descriptions in our procurement data. Third, for product descriptions that are not suc-
cessfully classified in the second step, either because the goods are non-traded, or because the product
description is insufficiently specific, we develop a clustering algorithm to group product descriptions
into clusters of similar descriptions.
Once our data is grouped into products, we create our main outcome of interest–unit prices—in three
steps. First, we standardize all units to be in SI units (e.g. convert all lengths to meters). Second, for each
good, we keep only the most frequent standardized units i.e. if a good is usually purchased by weight
and sometimes by volume, we keep only purchases by weight. Third, we drop the top and bottom 5%
of the unit prices for each good since in some cases the number of units purchased is off by an order
of magnitude spuriously creating very large or very small unit prices due to measurement error in the
quantity purchased.
OA.6.1 Preparing Text Data
The first step of our procedure ‘tokenizes’ the sentences that we will use as inputs for the rest of the
procedure. We use two datasets of product descriptions. First, we use the universe of customs declara-
tions on imports and exports to & from Russia in 2011–2013. Second, we use the product descriptions in
our procurement data described in section 4.1. Each product description is parsed in the following way,
using the Russian libraries for Python’s Natural Language Toolkit59
59Documentation on the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) can be found at http://www.nltk.org/
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1. Stop words are removed that are not core to the meaning of the sentence, such as “the”, “and”, and
“a”.
2. The remaining words are lemmatized, converting all cases of the same word into the same ‘lemma’
or stem. For example, ‘potatoes’ become ‘potato’.
3. Lemmas two letters or shorter are removed.
We refer to the result as the tokenized sentence. For example the product description “NV-Print Cartridge
for the Canon LBP 2010B Printer” would be broken into the following tokens: [cartridge, NV-Print,
printer, Canon, LBP, 3010B]. 60 Similarly, the product description “sodium bicarbonate - solution for
infusion 5%,200ml” would result in the following tokens: [sodium, bicarbonate, solution, infusion, 5%,
200ml].61
OA.6.2 Classification
In the second step of our procedure we train a classification algorithm to label each of the sentences in
the customs data with one of the HC labels in the set of labels in the customs dataset, HC . To prepare
our input data, each of the NC tokenized sentences ti in the customs dataset is transformed into a vector
of token indicators and indicators for each possible bi-gram (word-pair), denoted by xi ∈ XC .62 Each
sentence also has a corresponding good classification gi ∈ GC , so we can represent our customs data as
the pair {XC , gC} and we seek to find a classifier gˆC (x) : XC → HC that assigns every text vector x to a
product code.
As is common in the literature, rather than solving this multiclass classification problem in a single
step, we pursue a “one-versus-all” approach and reduce the problem of choosing among G possible
good classifications to GC binary choices between a single good and all other goods, and then combine
them (Rifkin & Klautau, 2004). Each of the GC binary classification algorithms generates a prediction
pg (xi), for whether sentence i should be classified as good g. We then classify each sentence as the good
with the highest predicted value:
gˆC (xi) = arg max
g∈GC
pg (xi) (OA.44)









max {0, 1− ygi · (wg · xi + ag)} (OA.45)
60The original Russian text reads as êàðòðèäæ NV-Print äëß ïðèíòåðà Canon LBP 3010B with the following set of
Russian tokens: [êàðòðèäæ, NV-Print, ïðèíòåð, Canon, LBP, 3010B].
61The original Russian text reads as íàòðèß ãèäðîêàðáîíàò - ðàñòâîð äëß èíôóçèé 5%,200ìë with the set of Russian
tokens as: [íàòðèß, ãèäðîêàðáîíàò, ðàñòâîð, èíôóçèß, 5%, 200ìë].
62The customs entry “Electric Table Lamps Made of Glass" is transformed into the set of tokens: [electric, table, lamp, glass].
The original Russian reads as ëàìïû ýëåêòðè÷åñêèå íàñòîëüíûå èç ñòåêëà and the tokens as: [ýëåêòðè÷åñêèé, íàñòîëü-
íûé, ëàìï, ñòåêëî].
63A description of the support vector loss function (hinge loss), which estimates the mode of the posterior class probabilities,




1 if gi = g−1 otherwise
The minimands wˆg and aˆg are then used to compute pg (xi) = wˆg · xi + aˆg with which the final classifi-
cation is formed using equation (OA.44). We implement this procedure using the Vowpal Wabbit library
for Python.64 This simple procedure is remarkably effective; when trained on a randomly selected half
of the customs data and then implemented on the reamining data for validation, the classifications are
correct 95% of the time. Given this high success rate without regularization, we decided not to try and
impose a regularization penalty to improve out of sample fit.
Having trained the algorithm on the customs dataset, we now want to apply it to the procurement
dataset wherever possible. This is known as transfer learning (see, for example Torrey & Shavlik (2009)).
Following the terminology of Pang & Yang (2010), our algorithm gˆC performs the task TC = {HC , gC (·)}
learning the function gC (·) that maps from observed sentence data X to the set of possible customs
labels GC . The algorithm was trained in the domain DC = {XC ,F (X)} where F (X) is the probability
distribution of X. We now seek to transfer the algorithm to the domain of the procurement dataset,
DB = {XB,F (X)} so that it can perform the task TB = {HB, gB (·)}. Examples of the classification
outcomes can be found in Tables OA.1 (translated into English) and OA.2 (in the original Russian). The
three columns on the left present the tokens from the descriptions of goods in the procurement data,
along with an identifying contract number and the federal law under which they were concluded. The
columns on the right indicate the 10-digit HS code (‘13926100000 - Office or school supplies made of
plastics’) that was assigned to all four of the goods using the machine learning algorithm. In addition,
we present the tokenized customs entries that correspond to this 10 digit HS code.
The function to be learned and the set of possible words used are unlikely to differ between the
two domains—A sentence that is used to describe a ball bearing in the customs data will also describe
a ball bearing in the procurement data—so XC = XB , and hC (·) = hB (·). The two key issues that
we face are first, that the likelihoods that sentences are used are different in the two samples so that
F (X)C 6= F (X)B . This could be because, for example, the ways that importers and exporters describe
a given good differs from the way public procurement officials and their suppliers describe that same
good. In particular, the procurement sentences are sometimes not as precise as those used in the trade
data. The second issue is that the set of goods that appear in the customs data differs from the goods in
the procurement data so thatHC 6= HB . This comes about because non-traded goods will not appear in
the customs data, but may still appear in the procurement data.
To deal with these issues, we identify the sentences in the procurement data that are unlikely to
have been correctly classified by hˆC and instead group them into goods using the clustering procedure
described in section OA.6.3 below. We use two criteria to identify incorrectly labeled sentences. First, we
identify sentences that have been classified as belonging to a certain good, but are very different from the
average sentence with that classification in the customs data. Second, sentences for which the classifier
assigns a low prediction score for all products are deemed to be incorrectly labeled.
64See http://hunch.net/~vw/.
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TABLE OA.1: EXAMPLE CLASSIFICATION - ENGLISH
Contract ID Law Product Description HS10
Code
Example Import Entries
5070512 94FZ folder, file, Erich, Krause,
Standard, 3098, green
3926100000 product, office, made of,
plastic
15548204 44FZ cover, plastic, clear 3926100000 office, supply, made of,
plastic, kids, school, age,
quantity
16067065 44FZ folder, plastic 3926100000 supply, office, cover, plastic,
book
18267299 44FZ folder, plastic, Brauberg 3926100000 collection, office, desk, indi-
vidual, plastic, packaging,
retail, sale
TABLE OA.2: EXAMPLE CLASSIFICATION - RUSSIAN
Contract ID Law Product Description HS10
Code
Example Import Entries
5070512 94FZ Ïàïêà, ôàéë, Erich,
Krause, Standard, 3098,
çåë¼íàß
3926100000 èçäåëèå, êàíöåëßðñêèé, èç-
ãîòîâëåííûé, ïëàñòèê



















To identify outlier sentences, we take the tokenized sentences that have been labeled as good g,
tg = {ti : gˆC (xi) = g} and transform them into vectors of indicators for the tokens vgi.65 For each good,
we then calculate the mean sentence vector in the customs data as vCg = ∑vgi,xi∈XC vgi/ |tg|. Then,
to identify outlier sentences in the procurement data, we calculate each sentence’s normalized cosine
similarity with the good’s mean vector,
θgi =
s¯g − s (vgi, vg)
s¯g
(OA.46)















is the cosine similarity of the sentence
vector vgi with its good mean vg,66 Kg is the number of tokens used in descriptions of good g, and
s¯g = ∑
|tg |
i=1 s (vgi, vg) is the mean of good g’s sentence cosine similarities. Sentences with a normalized
cosine similarity above a threshold θ are deemed to be misclassified. To choose the threshold θ, we use
the customs data again. We apply the classification algorithm to the customs data, and identify correctly
classified sentences (gˆC (xi) = gi) and incorrectly classified sentences (gˆC (xi) 6= gi). A typical choice of
the threshold θ will minimize the sum of type I and type II errors





















is roughly flat between 0.65 and 0.95, so we choose 0.95. In our second
criterion, we deem a sentence to be incorrectly classified if all predictive scores are below 0.1. i.e. if
maxg∈GC pg (xi) < 0.1.
OA.6.3 Clustering
The third step of our procedure takes the misclassified sentences from the classification step and groups
them into clusters of similar sentences. We will then use these clusters as our good classification for
this group of purchases. To perform this clustering we use the popular K-means method. This method
groups the tokenized sentences into k clusters by finding a centroid ck for each cluster to minimize the






‖f (c, ti)− ti‖2 (OA.48)
where f (c, ti) returns the closest centroid to ti. To speed up the clustering on our large dataset we im-
plemented the algorithm by mini-batch k-means. Mini-batch k means iterates over random subsamples
65Note that these vectors differ from the inputs xi to the classifier in two ways. First, they are specific to a certain good, and
second, they omit bigrams of the tokens
66Note that the cosine similarity ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 being orthogonal vectors and 1 indicating vectors pointing in the
same direction.
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(in our case of size 500) to minimize computation time. In each iteration, each sentence is assigned to
it’s closest centroid, and then the centroids are updated by taking a convex combination of the sentence
and its centroid, with a weight on the sentence that converges to zero as the algorithm progresses (see
Sculley (2010) for details).
The key parameter choice for the clustering exercise is k, the number of clusters to group the sen-
tences into. As is common in the literature, we make this choice using the silhouette coefficient. For each
sentence, its silhouette coefficient is given by
η (i) =
b (i)− a (i)
max {b (i) , a (i)} (OA.49)
where a (i) is the average distance between sentence i and the other sentences in the same cluster, and
b (i) is the average distance between sentence i and the sentences in the nearest cluster to sentence i’s
cluster. A high value of the silhouette coefficient indicates that the sentence is well clustered: it is close to
the sentences in its cluster and far from the sentences in the nearest cluster. Picking k = 10, 500 produces
a low silhouette coefficient, and results are not sensitive to using a lower value of 6, 500 or to dropping
all the clustered data and using only the correctly classified data.
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OA.7 Additional Figures and Tables
FIGURE OA.1: EVENT STUDIES OF PRICES AROUND SWITCHES BETWEEN GOODS













−1 0 1 2




































−1 0 1 2

























The figure shows time trends in prices around switches in the products that bureaucrats (Panel A) or organizations (Panel B)
are purchasing. The horizontal axis measures days on which bureaucrat-product pairs (organization-product pairs in Panel B)
occur together, with time 0 being the last day on which the bureaucrat purchases the old product just before switch, and time 1
being the first day the bureaucrat buys the new product after the switch. The y axis measures average residualized prices paid
by the bureaucrat-product pair where prices are residualized by regressing log unit prices on month fixed effects. We create a
balanced panel in which we require each bureaucrat-product pair to occur together on two separate days and each bureaucrat
to purchase at least one other product in the quarter containing time 0 (for the “old” product the bureaucrat purchases before
the switch) or time 1 (for the product the “new” product the bureaucrat purchases after the switch). Products are classified into
quartiles according to their average (residualized) prices when purchased by other bureaucrats in the quarter containing time
0 (for the old product) or the quarter containing time 1 (for the new product).
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FIGURE OA.2: EVENT STUDIES OF PRICES: 3-DAY BALANCED PANELS
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PANEL B: EVENT STUDY AROUND PANEL C: EVENT STUDY AROUND
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The figure shows time trends in prices around switches in the bureaucrat that organizations use to make purchases (Panel A);
the products that bureaucrats are purchasing (Panel B); and the products that organizations are purchasing (Panel C). Panel
A is constructed in the same way as figure 2 but with the additional requirement that each bureaucrat-organization pair work
together on three separate days. Similarly, Panel B is constructed in the same way as panel A of figure OA.1 but requiring
bureaucrat-product pairs to occur on three separate days, and Panel C is constructed in the same way as panel B of figure OA.1
but requiring organization-product pairs to occur on three separate days.
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The figure presents a heatmap of averages of the residuals from the estimation of equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj +
γs(b,j) + εi. The residuals are binned by vingtiles of the estimated bureaucrat effect αˆb and organization effect ψˆj within each
connected set of organizations. The sample used is the Largest Connected Set (All Products) summarized in Table 1.
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TABLE OA.3: TOTAL PROCUREMENT IN RUSSIA BY TYPE OF MECHANISM USED
2011 % 2012 % 2013 % 2014 % 2015 % 2011-2015 %
Electronic Auctions 74.75 46.4 111.12 54.6 113.96 58.0 94.97 51.7 93.66 51.5 488.45 52.7
Single Supplier 38.49 23.9 44.34 21.8 41.87 21.3 32.49 17.7 39.92 21.9 197.12 21.3
Request for Quotations 5.94 3.7 5.81 2.9 5.67 2.9 2.18 1.2 1.88 1.0 21.47 2.3
Open Tender 29.94 18.6 42.10 20.7 34.81 17.7 44.41 24.2 32.64 17.9 183.90 19.8
Other Methods 11.91 7.4 0.20 0.1 0.18 0.1 9.53 5.2 13.85 7.6 35.67 3.8
Total Procurement 161.10 203.64 196.56 183.64 182.02 926.95
Russian Non-Resource GDP 1,431.68 1,705.01 1,815.10 2,006.63 2,208.35 9,166.77
Procurement / Non-Resource GDP (%) 11.3 11.9 10.8 9.2 8.2 10.1
This table presents summary statistics about how much procurement was completed under federal laws 94FZ and 44FZ each year according to
the mechanism used. All sums are measured in billions of US dollars at an exchange rate of 30 rubles to 1 US dollar. Data on Russian procure-
ment comes from the central nationwide Register for public procurement in Russia (http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/main/public/home.html).
Data on Russian GDP comes from International Financial Statistics (IFS) at the International Monetary Fund (http://data.imf.org/), which
we adjust using the percentage of GDP coming from natural resources rents as calculated by the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS?locations=RU&name_desc=true).
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TABLE OA.4: SHARE OF VARIANCE OF PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION EXPLAINED BY BUREAUCRATS AND ORGANI-
ZATIONS: RELAXING HOMOGENEOUS GOODS ASSUMPTION (KHANDELWAL (2010) MEASURE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
(1) s.d. of Bur + Org Effects Within CS (across items) 1.005 0.945 0.872 0.809 0.817
(2) s.d. of Total Bur + Org Effects (across items) 1.164 1.119 1.034 0.961 1.008
(3) s.d. of log P 2.621 2.604 2.518 2.378 2.388
(4) s.d. of log P | good, month 1.656 1.683 1.578 1.501 1.526
(5) s.d. of Bur+Org Within Efs / s.d. of log P | good, month 0.607 0.562 0.553 0.539 0.535
(6) s.d. of Bur+Org Total Efs / s.d. of log P | good, month 0.703 0.665 0.655 0.640 0.660
(7) Sample Size 1,411,879 2,831,108 4,271,364 5,727,087 7,055,150
The table implements the variance decomposition in equation (12) using the estimates from equation (11): pi = Xiβ + αb(i,j) + ψj + γs(b,j) + εi. Each observation is
an item procured by an organization j and a bureaucrat indexed by b(i, j). Column (6) uses the sub-sample consisting of all auctions for goods that our text analysis
classification method is able to assign a 10-digit product code and that we can match to the scope-for-quality-differentiation ladder developed by Khandelwal (2010).
Column (4) removes the quintile with the highest scope-for-quality-differentiation according to the Khandelwal (2010) ladder, Column (3) the highest two quintiles,
and so on.
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TABLE OA.5: AVERAGE EFFECT OF BID PREFERENCES FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCERS ON PROCURE-
MENT PRICES AND AUCTION ENTRY: ANALYSIS SAMPLE, RAW FIXED EFFECTS
Prices (P) Participation (N)
Analysis Sample Largest Connected Set Analysis Sample Largest Connected Set
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Standardized Quantity −0.478∗∗∗ −0.539∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003)
Good covered by Prefs. 0.068∗∗∗ 0.043 −0.036 −0.074∗∗
(0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.034)
Policy Active 0.018 0.002 0.229∗∗ 0.262∗∗
(0.025) (0.042) (0.107) (0.122)
Bureaucrat FE 0.945∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.018) (0.086) (0.079)
Organization FE 0.952∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.018) (0.082) (0.078)
Good covered by Prefs. * Policy Active −0.115∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.033) (0.030) (0.042)
Bureaucrat FE * Good covered by Prefs. 0.036∗∗ 0.005 0.061 −0.006
(0.015) (0.019) (0.038) (0.040)
Bureaucrat FE * Policy Active −0.005 −0.021 0.010 −0.075
(0.011) (0.013) (0.088) (0.091)
Organization FE * Good covered by Prefs. 0.045∗∗∗ 0.017 0.077∗∗ 0.041
(0.016) (0.018) (0.035) (0.042)
Organization FE * Policy Active −0.007 −0.023∗ 0.032 −0.070
(0.012) (0.013) (0.084) (0.090)
Bureaucrat FE * Good covered by Prefs. * Policy Active −0.154∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.025) (0.051) (0.058)
Organization FE * Good covered by Prefs. * Policy Active −0.143∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.023) (0.051) (0.064)
Outcome Mean 5.69 6.26 1.64 1.68
Month, Good FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Product×Size×Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Connected Set FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,957,594 3,973,832 15,957,594 3,973,832
R2 0.652 0.698 0.377 0.369
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table implements a triple-difference approach, interacting the Intent to Treat (ITT) from
equation (21) with the estimated bureaucrat and organization effects from Section 5. Unlike 9, the effects included in these
models are raw, i.e. they are not estimated using the shrinkage method. In columns (1) and (3) the sample used is the combi-
nation of the Analysis Sample summarized in Column (2) of Table 1 and “treated” auctions that the procurers therein carried
out. In columns (2) and (4) the sample used is the combination of the Largest Connected Set summarized in Column (3) of
Table 1 and “treated” auctions that the procurers therein carried out. The first two columns estimate the triple-difference on the
log price paid for each item (P); the second two columns estimate the triple-difference on the number of bidders participating
in the auction (N). An item has Preferenced (Good on list) = 1 if the type of good appears on the list of goods covered by the
preferences policy for that year. Policy Active = 1 during the part of the relevant year that the preferences policy was in effect.
The Outcome Mean is the mean of the dependent variable in the control group, i.e. for goods that were not covered by pref-
erences purchased during the period when the preferences policy was not active. Month and good fixed effects are included
in all columns, as are interactions between 2-digit HS Product categories, years, region, and lot size. (We use “product” to
distinguish the categories used in these interactions from the much more disaggregate goods categories used for the good fixed
effects). Standard errors are clustered on month and good.
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TABLE OA.6: HOW EFFECT OF BID PREFERENCES FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCERS ON PROCUREMENT PRICES AND PARTICIPATION
VARIES WITH BUREAUCRAT AND ORGANIZATION EFFECTIVENESS: PLACEBO TESTS
Panel A: Placebo Test for Moving Policy Active Dates Forward
Prices (P) Participation (N)
Analysis Sample 1 Month Forward 2 Months Forward 3 Months Forward Analysis Sample 1 Month Forward 2 Months Forward 3 Months Forward
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bureaucrat FE * Preferenced (Good on list) * Policy Active −0.183∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.055) (0.057) (0.064) (0.071)
Organization FE * Preferenced (Good on list) * Policy Active −0.164∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗ −0.065 −0.081∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗
(0.029) (0.035) (0.044) (0.032) (0.060) (0.067) (0.076) (0.103)
Outcome Mean 5.69 5.44 5.70 5.76 1.64 1.99 1.72 1.81
Month, Good FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Product×Size×Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Connected Set FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,957,594 15,957,594 15,957,594 15,957,594 15,957,594 15,957,594 15,957,594 15,957,594
R2 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.372 0.370 0.370 0.370
Panel B: Placebo Test for Turning Off Policy in 2015
Prices (P) Participation (N)
Analysis Sample 3 Months Off 4 Months Off 5 Months Off Analysis Sample 3 Months Off 4 Months Off 5 Months Off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bureaucrat FE * Preferenced (Good on list) * Policy Active −0.183∗∗∗ −0.017 0.003 0.038 −0.279∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.011 0.013
(0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.048) (0.055) (0.045) (0.023) (0.036)
Organization FE * Preferenced (Good on list) * Policy Active −0.164∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.039 −0.021 −0.307∗∗∗ 0.019 0.023 0.009
(0.029) (0.024) (0.035) (0.044) (0.060) (0.061) (0.035) (0.037)
Outcome Mean 5.69 5.44 5.70 5.76 1.64 1.99 1.72 1.81
Month, Good FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Product×Size×Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Connected Set FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,957,594 3,817,427 3,817,427 3,817,427 15,957,594 3,817,427 3,817,427 3,817,427
R2 0.645 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.372 0.397 0.397 0.397
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table implements the same triple-difference approach from Table 9, but includes placebo analysis where the date the preferences
policy becomes active is varied. An item has Preferenced (Good on list) = 1 if the type of good appears on the list of goods covered by the preferences policy for that
year. In both Panels, columns (1) and (5) are identical to Columns (1) and (2) from Table 9. The main analysis sample and the true date the preference policy became
active are used to estimate the triple-difference on the log price paid for each item (P) and the number of bidders participating in the auction (N). In Panel A, the other
columns use the main analysis sample but change the date that Policy Active = 1 away from the true date. Columns (2) and (6) move up the dates the preferences
became active and went out of effect by 1 month, Columns (3) and (7) by 2 months, etc. In Panel B, the columns (2)-(4) and columns (6)-(8) restrict the sample to only
those purchases made in 2015 (when the preferences policy was active throughout). As a placebo test, columns (2) and (5) turn off the preferences policy for the first
3 months of the year, columns (3) and (6) turn off the preferences policy for the first 4 months of the year, etc. Only the estimates of interest are shown (the triple
interaction), but all constituent terms and lower interactions are included in the regressions. The Outcome Mean is the mean of the dependent variable in the control
group, i.e. for goods that were not covered by preferences purchased during the period when the preferences policy was not active. Month and good fixed effects are
included in all columns, as are interactions between 2-digit HS Product categories, years, region, and lot size. (We use “product” to distinguish the categories used in
these interactions from the much more disaggregate goods categories used for the good fixed effects). Standard errors are clustered on month and good.
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